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Nature loss 'to damage economies'

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http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science_and_environment/10103179.stm

"An ongoing project known as The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) is attempting to quantify the monetary value of various services that nature provides for us.

These services include purifying water and air, protecting coasts from storms and maintaining wildlife for ecotourism.

The rationale is that when such services disappear or are degraded, they have to be replaced out of society's coffers."

How ridiculous is this? That we can put a price on eco system services is ludicrous! and who does it benefit to formulate such a price?

If we have a 200 hectare area of rain forest, the most intensely bio-diverse habitat known, and owned by a company, do they care how much the ecosystem services of that forest is worth? No they don't because to the company the only profit to be made is from bringing the timber to market and then re using the land for some other profit making development. It doesn't matter if the ecosystem services are worth 4 hundred or 4 billion dollars for our small stretch of forest because that value cannot be converted to cash in the bank.

 From a corporate perspective, the only one that counts when converting natural resources into profit, the value of the ecosystem services provided are 0$ and always will be. That at some point in the future we will use the profits from the cash invested from the destruction of the forest to provide artificial substitutes for ecosystem services is also stupid. We're not even sure of all the ecosystem service we gain from nature let alone how to replicate them.

 The only solution is government legislation providing total protection for the ecosystem services nature provides humanity but considering we live in a capitalist society and the corporate economic subsystem is showing clear signs of sub-optimization of societies entire hierarchy from top (political) to bottom (brainwashing your kids through TV advertising) I wouldn't hold my breath for any political solution.

The hubris is shocking!

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A clean, simple computation, no doubt, only that it never works

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What gets accumulated?

 

To a lay person, the question may seem simple to answer: money. Capitalists accumulate when they grow richer; they decumulate when they become poorer. And that is certainly true, but not entirely. To see what is missing, suppose that the actual holdings of a capitalist haven’t changed but that their prices have all risen by 10 per cent, thus making him 10 per cent richer. Now assume further that the overall price level – measured by the GDP price deflator – has also grown at the same rate of 10 per cent, so that the ‘amount’ of commodities the capitalist can buy with his assets remains the same. The capitalist has certainly accumulated in nominal terms, but this increase was merely a price phenomenon. Since the process has affected neither the ‘productive capacity’ of his assets nor their ‘purchasing power’, from a material perspective he has ended right where he started. For this reason, political economists – conservative and critical alike – insist that when measuring accumulation we ignore the price of capital and concentrate only on its material, or ‘real’, quantity.

 

There is, of course, nothing very unusual about this insistence. After all, political economy is concerned primarily with material processes, so it seems only sensible that the same emphasis should apply to capital. The only problem is that in order to focus on ‘real’ quantities, we first have to separate them from prices; and surprising at it may sound, in general the two cannot be separated.

 

Separating quantity from price

 

To understand the difficulty, let’s put aside the theory for a moment and look at what the statisticians do. Their procedure is straightforward: they assume that the dollar market value of any basket of commodities (MV) is equal to its ‘real’ quantity (Q) times its unit price (P), and then they rearrange the equation. Symbolically, they start from:

 

1. MV = Q × P

 

Which is equivalent to:

 

2. Q = MV/P

 

These formulae are taken to be completely general. They apply to any basket of commodities at any point in time – from the contents of a supermarket cart pushed by a London shopper in 2008, to the annual output of the Chinese economy in 2000, to the global stock of ‘capital goods’ in 1820. Given data on the market value and price of any set of commodities, calculating its ‘real’ quantity and growth rate is a simple matter of plugging in the numbers and computing the results.

 

To illustrate, suppose the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis wishes to calculate the ‘real’ rate of accumulation in the automobile industry from 1990 to 2000. The statisticians know that, over the decade, the market value (at replacement cost) of the industry’s capital stock (MV) grew by 93 per cent and that 17 per cent of that increase was due to a rise in unit price (P). Based on these data, the statisticians can easily tell us that the ‘real’ rate of accumulation – measured by the rate of growth of Q – was 65 per cent (1.93 / 1.17 –1 ≈ 0.65).2

 

A clean, simple computation, no doubt, only that it never works. The failure is as general as the formulas. The calculation fails with ‘capital goods’, just as it fails with GDP, private consumption, gross investment or any other collection of heterogeneous commodities. And the reason is embarrassingly simple. Equation (2) above tells us that in order to compute the quantity we first need to know the price. What it doesn’t say is that in order to know the price we first need to know the quantity. . . .

 

To see the circularity, consider the following facts. An automotive factory is made of many different tools, machines and structures. Over time, the nature of these items tends to change. They may take less time and effort to produce; they may become more or less ‘productive’ due to technical improvement and wear and tear; their composition may change with new machines replacing older ones; they may be used to produce different and even entirely new output; etc. The result of these many changes is that today’s automobile factories are not the same as yesterday’s, or as last year’s. The price index of automobile factories, however, is supposed to track, over time, the price of the very same factories. The obvious question, then, is: ‘How can such an index be computed when the underlying factories – the “things” whose price the index is supposed to measure – keep changing from one year to the next?’

Jay Hanson

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The Century of Self

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Edited by Neal Grout, Thursday, 29 Apr 2010, 11:55

This TV documentary details the suboptimization (dominance to the detriment) of society by the economic subsystem. This suboptimization pervades all levels of society heirachy from the top (politics) to the citizens in their day to day lives (TV advertising and the bank bailouts).

http://www.rewtube.com/the-century-of-the-self-episode-1/

http://www.rewtube.com/the-century-of-the-self-episode-2/

http://www.rewtube.com/the-century-of-the-self-episode-3/

http://www.rewtube.com/the-century-of-the-self-episode-4/

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The Imminent Crash Of The Oil Supply: What Is Going To Happen And How It Came To Pass That We Weren’t Forewarned

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Edited by Neal Grout, Tuesday, 27 Apr 2010, 14:28
http://www.inteldaily.com/2010/04/oil-crash/
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Quote of the Day

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Edited by Neal Grout, Tuesday, 23 Mar 2010, 08:05

"We are in the midst of the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression, and we are merely on a production plateau - producing the most oil that's ever before been produced!"

Gail the Actuary www.oildrum.com

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The Importance of Equality in Society

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http://www.yesmagazine.org/happiness/want-the-good-life-your-neighbors-need-it-too
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Rediculous Quote

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Edited by Neal Grout, Thursday, 18 Mar 2010, 18:35
"You have to separate the economic from the physical point of view. Many of the mistakes people make come from this. Like the stupid projections of the Club of Rome: they used a purely physical approach, without taking prices into account."

Milton Friedman, Economist
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Ecosystem Services Rant

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Edited by Neal Grout, Sunday, 21 Mar 2010, 09:48

While watching the BBC world news the other day a reporter said that the world squanders 4 trillion dollars worth of ecosystem services per year.

How can they possibly put a price on ecosystem services?

Firstly, were probably not even aware of all the services that nature provides. Second, most of these services are unsubstitutional. That is, we cannot replace nature with manmade equivilents. 

I think a good analogy is to compare the Earths ecosystem services to a life suport machine in a hospital. The Earth is the life support machine while humanity is the patient being kept alive.

Now its possible for the hospital managers and accountants to price the machine, at say, 20,000 pounds worth of equipment but is it worth the same to the patient?

To the patient the machine is invaluable because without it he is dead and then the cost, in whatever currency you like, dollars, pounds or marbles, is irrelevant.

Humanity cannot put a price on ecosystem services because they are the life support machine for each and every one of us.

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Hagbard's Law

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"This sort of thing is all too common in contemporary science. In many fields, ambitious young scientists far outnumber the available grants and tenured positions at universities, and the temptation to misconduct for the sake of professional success is strong. Though overt fakery still risks punishment, less blatant forms of scientific fraud pay off handsomely in papers published, grants awarded, and careers advanced. Since science is expected to police itself, scientific fraud gets the same treatment as, say, sexual abuse among the clergy or malpractice among physicians: except in the most blatant cases, punishing the guilty takes a back seat to getting along with one’s peers and preserving the reputation of one’s institution and profession."

John Michael Greer

http://thearchdruidreport.blogspot.com/search?q=predicament

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Collapse Dynamics

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Edited by Neal Grout, Thursday, 18 Mar 2010, 18:35
http://vinay.howtolivewiki.com/blog/other/noah-raford-collapse-dynamics-26-may-2009-london-school-of-economics-1539
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A Comparison of Yeast Cultures and Human Globalized Society from an Ecological Perspective

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Edited by Neal Grout, Thursday, 18 Mar 2010, 18:36

A Comparison of Yeast Cultures and Human Globalized Society from an Ecological Perspective

 

“Are Humans Smarter than Yeast?” Bob Shaw

 

Introduction

On an individual basis your average man can out smart, and out run, a typical yeast cell. But what about on a communal level? What are the similarities and differences between our modern human society and yeast colonies in regards to environment, growth and sustainability?

Ecological Definitions

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From an ecological perspective a species is considered to be in overshoot of its environment when the population exceeds the carrying capacity of said environment. Carrying capacity is the maximum number of individuals of a given species that an environment can support. To exceed the carrying capacity a surplus energy resource is needed to do so. A drawdown of the surplus resource then takes place while the population of organisms grows.  At the same time degradation of environment occurs as waste products build up. The resource is, at an exponential rate, eventually used up by the growing numbers of the organism and the environment is degraded from the effects of pollution. The species, no longer able to support its numbers because there is insufficient energy or because the environmental degradation can no longer support them, experiences a crash in numbers. The die off takes the population down lower than the original starting number of organisms because the environment has been degraded and the carrying capacity therefore reduced. (The Language of Ecology)

Mead

Mead was a tradition drink made in many parts of the world especially where a Northerly climate did not allow good grape production. Although not often made commercially due to ingredient costs, mead making is still popular for small time enthusiasts (myself included) because of its ease of production and usually gives a good quality end result.

The main ingredients to make mead are honey, water and yeast. At a basic level the fermentation process begins by creating the must. This is the water/honey solution, the energy source needed, that the yeast will ferment in, the ration being 4 or 5 to 1 respectively. The must is stored in a sanitized container called a carboy. It is essential the carboy is clean so the yeast can ferment without having to compete with other micro organisms. The must is almost always acidified because a slightly acidic environment is conductive for yeast growth but not so for other micro organisms such as bacteria. It’s important that the must is oxygenated in the beginning of fermentation because the yeast will for the first few days grow aerobically before later convert to anaerobic production.

The yeast is pitched into the carboy and begins to multiply. Its population grows exponentially, doubling in size every 90 minutes (Pines, 2001), making a drawdown on the sugars in the honey to feed and reproduce whilst at the same time producing the waste products, Carbon Dioxide and Alcohol.  C02 is released from the carboy through an airlock system. This is necessary as any build up of gas within the carboy can cause it to eventually explode especially when fermentation is vigorous. The alcohol level builds over time within the carboy. This is the byproduct looked for to produce an alcoholic beverage but it is at the same time detrimental to the yeast producing it. The yeast degrade their own environment with the pollution they themselves make.

 

 

A Tale of Two Yeast Colonies

Depending on whether a sweet or dry mead is wanted, two different species of yeast are used. For  sweet mead, Saccharomyces cerevisiae and for dry Saccharomyces bayanus respectively.

S. cerevisiae; Leaves 2-3% residual sugar in most meads. Rich, fruity profile complements fruit mead fermentation.


Flocculation: Medium
Temperature Range: 65-75°F, 18-24°C
Alcohol Tolerance: 11% ABV

S. bayanus; Low foaming with little or no sulfur production.


Flocculation: Low-medium
Temperature Range: 55-75°F, 13-24°C
Alcohol Tolerance: 18% ABV

We can see above that S. cerevisiae does not have the same level of alcohol tolerance as S. bayanus. Unable to tolerate the alcohol it has produced S. cerevisiae experiences a die-off because of it’s over polluted environment. This leaves residual sugars in the final product, therefore creating a sweet mead.

On the other hand S. bayanus can tolerate the increasing alcohol levels but is then able to make a complete drawdown on the sugars in the must and therefore also experiences a die-off. With no residual sweetness, dry flavored mead is created. (Wyeast Laboratories, Inc)

We can see above then that there are two distinct possibilities for a yeast population die off, degradation of environment and resource depletion, each equally as devastating to the yeast population as the other.

 

Our Global Society in Comparison

Human population has been growing exponentially, doubling approximately every 40 years, and currently stands at 6.793 billion people. The growth rate of 1.19% increases the world population by 77 million per year. (International Database Information Gateway, 2009)

What evidence do we have to show that humanity is in overshoot of its environment, the Earth?

 

Environmental Degradation

Global Warming: Humanity adds carbon dioxide to the atmosphere through the use of fossil fuels such as petroleum, natural gas and coal, which increases in concentration over time as is evident from the Keeling curve. Carbon dioxide is by far the largest greenhouse gas emitted by human activity (along with methane and nitrous oxide) and is the prime agent affecting global warming and climate change. (Weart, 2007)

Climate Change: The latest core sample evidence suggests climate change can happen drastically when tipping points occur, altering weather patterns and atmospheric temperature within months. (Leake, 2009)

Water pollution:  Excess fertilizer run off from modern intensive agriculture in the form of excess nitrogen fertilizer creates dead zones in coastal regions. Fresh Water Rivers become polluted due to industrial processes making the water unfit for human consumption and killing native wildlife. (Dead Zone (Ecology))

Soil Erosion: Intensive modern agriculture strips the soil of its nutrients which then have to be replenished artificially using nitrogen made from natural gas and mined potash and potassium. Soil also suffers from erosion especially when tilled and during deforestation. Urbanization reduces land available for agriculture. (Draggan, Soil Erosion, 2008)

Desertification:  Spreading desert reduces the available land usable for agriculture and reduces biodiversity. This then leads to human populations migrating (Draggan, Desertification, 2008)

Sea Ice loss:  An indirect consequence of climate change. The melting of Arctic sea ice reduces the albedo effect and increases global warming creating a feedback loop. Current models predict Summer Arctic sea ice will completely disappear within the next decade. (NSIDC)

Glacial Melt:   Millions of people, especially in Asia and South America, rely on glacial melt water for drinking and irrigation of crops. (Glacier retreat and disappearance)

Chemical Toxicity:  Poisoning (McGinley, 2009)and feminization (Lean, 2008)can affect people and wildlife on many levels from dumped industrial waste materials to unsafe consumer goods. Bioaccumulation means species higher in the food chain (humans) suffer most from persistent organic  pollutants.

Biodiversity Loss: loss of wildlife is currently 50 to 500 times above background rate according to IUCN figures (International Union for the Conservation of Nature). In an effort to increase crop yields many species previously used in agricultural production have become extinct.

 

 

Resource Depletion

Deforestation: Wood is used as a fuel and building material. Forests are cleared for agricultural production. When large areas of forest are cleared this can also alter the local climate by increasing temperature and reducing rainfall.  Deforestation has been implicated in the fall of previous civilizations including the Maya (Fall of the Maya), Nazca (Coghlan, 2009)and Easter Islanders (Diamond, 1995).

Fossil Fuel Use: Industrialization has only been possible since the introduction of high energy sources such as fossil fuels. Of the three, crude oil, natural gas and coal, crude oil production is due to peak within the next decade. Petroleum fuels 95% of world transport infrastructure (Anderson, 2009).

Metal and Mineral Depletion: many of these are now at the point where extraction takes place from deep mines and/or from poor quality ores which require large amounts of energy. (Cohen, 2007)

Aquifer Depletion: Aquifers worldwide are being depleted much faster than they naturally replenish making it ever more difficult to irrigate crops. China, India, and the United States along with a number of other countries where water tables are falling, are home to more than half the world’s population. There are two types of aquifers: replenishable and nonreplenishable (fossil) aquifers. Most of the aquifers in India and the shallow aquifer under the North China Plain are replenishable. When these are depleted, the maximum rate of pumping is automatically reduced to the rate of recharge. (Brown, 2007)

Fisheries Collapse:  fisheries world wide are collapsing from intensive overfishing. Although overfishing has been going on since industrialization began (whale and Oyster populations collapsed over 100 years ago) it has only been since the 1950s when industrial scale fishing started that the most serious problems have be seen. The depletion of top predator species such as tuna, swordfish, marlin, cod, halibut, skate, and flounder can cause a shift in entire ocean ecosystems (Greenpeace International).

 

 

The Missing Link

Is it possible to correlate the actions of two very different life forms under such conditions even if they do share a large amount of the same genes? Can we find an example of a another life form, more closely related to Homo sapiens , a mammal, that displays the same characteristic boom and bust life cycle of the yeast in a carboy?

6be3ab73d132965a154265e83e101b08.gif

 

In 1944 a herd of 29 reindeer were introduced to St Mathews Island which is located in the Bering Sea Wildlife Refuge. With no predators to keep the population under control and an ample supply of vegetation (lichen, willow, and sedges) as a food energy source, the herd increased from 29 animals to 6000 in the summer of 1963 and underwent a crash die-off the following winter to less than 50 animals in 1957. (Klein)

Other organisms including bacteria, and higher life forms such as mice and rats, all go through a boom and bust cycle of population as long as there is an ample energy source to make a drawdown on.

 

Conclusion

Humanity is showing clear signs of population overshoot. In the same way yeast degrades its environment (the carboy) with carbon dioxide and alcohol, we also degrade ours (the Earth) also with carbon dioxide and toxins hazardous to life. In the same way yeast makes a drawdown in the sugars contained within the must, humanity makes a drawdown on a variety of resources to support its ever growing population and consumption.

Either environmental degradation or resource depletion can on their own cause a crash in population and many, if not all, life forms are susceptible to these problems under the correct conditions. Although there is a clear understanding that climate change (environmental degradation) is a possible serious problem, peak oil (resource depletion) is being mostly ignored by our society.

 

References

 

(n.d.). Retrieved November 12th, 2009, from Greenpeace International: http://www.greenpeace.org/international/campaigns/oceans/overfishing

Anderson, B. (2009, June 16th). Peak Oil Primer. Retrieved November 8th, 2009, from Energy Bulletin: http://www.energybulletin.net/primer.php

Brown, L. (2007, Febuary 12th). Aquifer depletion. Retrieved November 15th, 2009, from Encyclopedia of Earth: http://www.eoearth.org/article/Aquifer_depletion

Coghlan, A. (2009, November ). Clearing Oasis Trees Felled Ancient Peru Civilization. Retrieved November 20th, 2009, from New Scientist: http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn18091-clearing-oasis-trees-felled-ancient-peru-civilisation.html

Cohen, D. (2007, May). Earths Natural Wealth. Retrieved November 11th, 2009, from New Scientist: http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg19426051.200-earths-natural-wealth-an-audit.html

Dead Zone (Ecology). (n.d.). Retrieved November 21st, 2009, from Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dead_zone_(ecology)

Diamond, J. (1995, August). Easter Islands End. Retrieved November 19th , 2009, from http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/24/042.html

Draggan, S. (2008, September). Desertification. Retrieved November 20th, 2009, from Encyclopedia of earth: http://www.eoearth.org/article/Desertification

Draggan, S. (2008, March). Soil Erosion. Retrieved November 22nd, 2009, from Encyclopedia of Earth: http://www.eoearth.org/article/Soil_erosion_and_deposition

Fall of the Maya. (n.d.). Retrieved November 20th, 2009, from pyysorg.org: http://www.physorg.com/news174152911.html

Glacier retreat and disappearance. (n.d.). Retrieved November 22nd, 2009, from Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Effects_of_global_warming#Glacier_retreat_and_disappearance

International Database Information Gateway. (2009, September 10th). Retrieved November 20th, 2009, from US Census Bureau: http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/worldpopinfo.php

International Union for the Conservation of Nature. (n.d.). Retrieved November 21st, 2009, from http://www.iucn.org/

Klein, D. R. (n.d.). The Introduction, Increase, and Crash of Reindeer on St. Matthew Island. Retrieved November 9th, 2009, from http://www.greatchange.org/footnotes-overshoot-st_matthew_island.html

Leake, J. (2009, November). Climate change catastrophe took just months. Retrieved November 20th, 2009, from Times Online: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/science/earth-environment/article6917215.ece

Lean, G. (2008, December). Men really are the Weaker Sex. Retrieved November 10th , 2009, from The Independent: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/its-official-men-really-are-the-weaker-sex-1055688.html

McGinley, M. (2009, October). Retrieved November 20th, 2009, from Encyclopedia of Earth: http://www.eoearth.org/article/Human_impacts_on_the_biodiversity_of_the_Arctic

NSIDC. (n.d.). Retrieved November 22nd, 2009, from NSIDC: http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/faq.html

Pines, M. (2001). The Genes We Share. Retrieved November 14th, 2009, from Howard Hughes Medical Institute: http://www.hhmi.org/genesweshare/

The Language of Ecology. (n.d.). Retrieved November 22nd, 2009, from Dieoff.org: http://dieoff.org/page14.htm

Weart, S. (2007, June). The Discovery of Global Warming. Retrieved November 20th, 2009, from http://www.aip.org/history/climate/summary.htm

Wyeast Laboratories, Inc. (n.d.). Retrieved November 20th, 2009, from http://www.wyeastlab.com/

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Arctic Oil

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Edited by Neal Grout, Thursday, 18 Mar 2010, 18:38

RockyMtnGuy

 "They (The IEA) produced a wonderful study indicating that 25% of the world's oil reserves were in the arctic. As it happens, I worked for a company that ran a drilling fleet of 26 vessels in the Canadian Arctic Ocean for a decade or so. We also drilled a lot of wells in the MacKenzie Delta, and ran seismic surveys off the coast of Greenland. Some people I knew also got involved in Russian oil exploration, which was mostly an exercise in fighting Russian bureaucracy. While we found a lot of interesting things, we didn't find any commercial amounts of oil. It's drastically different from the Gulf of Mexico, which is what I assume the USGS is comparing it to. There's oil, but not enough to justify the costs. There's lots of natural gas, some tar sands, and some huge diamond deposits (now, that's what any geologist with a fully functional crystal ball would have gone after had they only known). But not much oil."

www.oildrum.com

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The Eternal Village, an Example in Sustainability

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Edited by Neal Grout, Thursday, 18 Mar 2010, 18:40
When we try to look for historical societies that were sustainable they are hard to come by. More primitive peoples usually got round the fact they degraded their immediate environment by moving to another spot to live and thus allowing the resources they used in the original place to replenish.
In more advanced static societies we have many examples of the boom and bust collapse of a population in overshoot including Rome, the Maya and the classic example, Easter Island. But we do have one example of a sustainable society that existed for hundreds of years with almost no population growth and that was medieval Europe. Unfortunately this is not the sort of sustainable that many modern users of the word have in mind.

THE ETERNAL VILLAGE

Let us begin by looking at an ordinary European village in the seventeenth century. This village, Sennely, which has been carefully studied by Professor Bouchard, has a claim to being considered typical. 1 A population of some 500 to 700 persons is typical enough. The village’s reliance on grain for bread-making as its chief crop is more than typical—it is universal. The thatch-roofed, windowless farmhouses, with their two rooms, attic, barn, and cowshed, are certainly normal.



Sennely is relatively isolated, as are most villages. Not that the city is far away; it is close enough so that tenant farmers pay their rents to absentee landlords in the city of Orleans. But the outside world does not impinge on the daily life of the villagers. Like most villages in preindustrial Europe, Sennely was a community of subsistence farmers whose needs were supplied locally: the rye grain, for bread; the cattle and pigs; the orchards that supply apples, pears, plums, and chestnuts; the garden vegetables; the fish in the ponds and the bees kept for honey and wax. Sennely had a miller, an innkeeper, a smith. There were part-time shopkeepers and weavers in residence. A villager hardly ever needed to go abroad.



This small, self-sufficient world is typical in another respect. It is fragile. The balance between resources and population is an uneasy one. The land is poor in Sennely. Water drains poorly. Evaporation from stagnant pools and ponds creates permanent ground fogs. This is not good land for growing grain. The poor soils of Sennely may not be typical. What is typical is the constraint under which the farmers operated, inasmuch as they had to grow grain, even though they would have been better off if they had concentrated on raising cattle.



What Sennely had in common with practically all European villages before the mid-nineteenth century was the need to be self-sufficient. Underdeveloped transportation and commercial networks forced the rural population to grow all essential crops, even those for which the land or the climate were unsuitable. Sennely could not buy grain and sell livestock in exchange. It was condemned to make do with its sandy soil. Unable to grow wheat, the preferred grain crop, Sennely planted rye. Poor yields were compensated for by the vast size of the village land, a good deal of it wasteland, swamps, and heath. It took about two hours to walk across the village’s territory and half the farms were spread out at a considerable distance from the village center. This dispersed habitat, an adaptation to the poor soil, no doubt goes a long way toward explaining Sennely’s lack of social cohesion. Although the village did possess a clear center, a street of houses, a square, a church, and a cemetery, most of the farms lay hidden in the distance, each of them screened by rows of oak trees.



Not surprisingly, travelers described the chief personality trait of the peasants of Sennely as suspicion. They seemed suspicious of outsiders and of each other and not much given to talking freely. Their physical appearance was remarked upon as distinctive. They tended to be stunted, bent over, and of a yellowish complexion. They were not born that way. The little children were said to be good looking, but by the time they had reached the age of ten or twelve, they assumed the generally unpleasant appearance of their elders. They did not look healthy. Their bellies were distended. They moved slowly, they had poor teeth, their growth was retarded. Girls reached the age of 18 before first menstruation.



What we have here, then, is a group of people living on the edge of deprivation. Malnutrition was normal in Sennely in the late seventeenth century. There are hints of better times in the past, but by the time the records become abundant enough for a clear analysis of this society, Sennely appears as a fragile entity, vulnerable to disease and, somehow, just barely, kept going in spite of the constant, threatening presence of death.



One third of the babies born died in their first year. Only a third of the children born in Sennely reached adulthood. Most couples had only one or two children before their marriage was broken up by the death of one parent. Women married late, at about age 23, on the average. Any given 100 women in Sennely would bear about 350 children in the course of their lives. Of these, only 145 would reach adulthood and marry in turn, 75 of them female. Allowing for 5 girls who would not marry, only 70 adult women were available to replace the 100 women of the preceding generation. Yet the population remained more or less constant. The villagers probably made up the deficit by marrying the daughters of transient artisans and laborers. When death struck a household, no time was wasted; widows and widowers remarried right away. Most first marriages occurred in the wake of a parent’s death, so that the farm and the family could continue to function with a normal complement of hardworking men and women.



Fragile in the face of its poor harvests, constantly threatened by hunger and disease, Sennely just barely managed to reproduce itself, to hold on to life behind its hedges. Yet, for all that, Sennely was not badly off when compared to other villages. The peasants of the nearby Beauce plateau, a prime wheat-growing region, looked down with contempt on sullen, watery Sennely. But when harvests failed in the Beauce, there was nothing to fall back on, since all the land was plowed for wheat. A succession of bad harvests was enough to transform the peasants of the Beauce into starving beggars. Having put all their eggs in one basket, they were helpless when the wheat fields failed them. They took to the road, begging for food. And it is on such grim occasions, when the peasants of Sennely open their houses to starving vagrants and feed them generously, that we notice the hidden strength of Sennely’s economy. Although it lives on the margin of poverty, Sennely never faces an all-out famine. Its inhabitants must have learned long ago that their meager grain crops had to be compensated for by making full use of the heath and ponds. They depended on their pigs, their cattle and sheep, their vegetables, fruit orchards, and fishing. It is this diversity, together with a low population density, that kept catastrophic famines away.



Not that everyone in Sennely enjoyed an equal level of protection against hard times. This was not a society of equals. The better-off farmers owned a team of horses and a plow. They did not exactly own their farms. They leased them from absentee landlords, but their customary rights to the land were so ancient that they were not in danger of losing them. These leaseholders belonged to the European-wide category of rich peasants known as laboureurs in France and as yeomen in England. Their wealth, however, was entirely relative. Distinguished by their possession of the expensive team and plow, they nevertheless lived just this side of poverty. It is only when they are compared to less fortunate peasants that they appear rich.



The estates of the laboureurs of Sennely can be evaluated at somewhere in the 2,000 livres range. By comparison, the social category just below, that of the renters (locataires) who do not own horses and plows, was made up of families whose worth was only in the 600 livres range. These tenant farmers were constantly in danger of losing the land they rented and of being reduced to the level of hired hands. Hired hands (journaliers) in Sennely owned nothing except, perhaps, the roof over their heads, a garden, a pig.



There was another category of villagers, that of the artisans who lived in the village center and owned no land. Their level of fortune lay somewhere in between that of the renters and hired hands. About half the peasant families in Sennely belonged to the better-off categories of leaseholders and renters, who had some property. The other half of the village’s population was made up of the families of hired hands and artisans who had no land at all.



A little to the side of these ordinary peasants, living on the main street of the village, their houses marked with painted signs indicative of their profession, we find three successful entrepreneurs: the smith, the miller, and the innkeeper. These families were among the most prosperous and influential in the village community. Barely involved in working the land, they dealt in goods and money. The innkeeper was also a contractor and a moneylender. There were horses and cows in his barn, his sheep grazed in the pastures, but he also bought up the grain owed to the Church and sold it on the open market. A handful of part-time shopkeepers of lesser wealth and stature completed the picture. They had a shop, a house, and a garden on the main street, but they could not live from trade alone. They also farmed and they dealt in cattle, hides, and wool.



On the fringes of village society, linked to it only in the sense that they owned property here, were rich outsiders who constituted the local elite. The priest, to begin with, whose house was the most imposing in the village. The priest had a comfortable income from rents and tithes assigned to the Church. He had a garden and an orchard. His house was a mansion of sorts, complete with salon, parlor, library, chapel, butler’s room, stable, bakery, barn, and servants’ quarters.



Side by side with the priest who presided over the Church’s real estate interests in Sennely, there were three or four other outsiders, substantial men of property: a notary, a business agent, and an estate manager. They represented absentee landlords, but they also had property of their own. The estate manager had two farms which he leased out, rents from a number of tenants, and a large herd of sheep. He lived in a six-room house and he had a servant.



On the outer fringes of Sennely’s territory, there were three small châteaux, belonging to wealthy gentlemen who were seen only occasionally, as they lived in the city and resided in their country châteaux only in summer or in the hunting season. The wealthiest of these gentlemen owned six farms locally, the others had three farms each.



Leaving the priest, the gentlemen, and their managers aside, we are still left with a village community marked by sharp contrasts of wealth and power. The landless peasants and artisans live in grim poverty. Their cottages are small, dark, and cold, they cannot afford firewood, they own only the clothes on their back and a pair of wooden clogs, their larders are often empty.



The more substantial farmers, meanwhile, are likely to possess reserves of bacon and cheese, wardrobes full of warm clothes, and much bedding to ward off the cold at night. In spite of these differences, there is no sign of strife in the village. This requires some explanation, especially since Sennely lacks most of the social controls one may find elsewhere. No resident lord provides leadership here, the priest’s influence is thin. At most, he visits a family once in three years. As for family ties, they are too weak to provide cohesion.



Family relations, as revealed in the parish registers where births, marriages, and deaths are recorded, confirm the casual observer’s view of the peasants of Sennely. Each family is on its own here. It is a bare-minimum family, consisting of a couple and one or two young children. For those who look back to the rural past with nostalgia, expecting to find large, noisy, heart-warming throngs of adults and children all living merrily under one roof, the evidence in Sennely is bound to prove a disappointment. These seventeenth-century peasant families are as isolated and as unstable as are modern families of wage earners living in impersonal housing projects on the periphery of industrial cities.



Grandparents are hard to find in Sennely, and so are aunts, uncles, or cousins living under one roof. The bread and bacon wrung out of each homestead cannot stretch to feed more than two adults and their babies. Bitter experience taught the peasants of Sennely to be calculating. They did not marry until death had cleared the way for the formation of a new family. Most young men and women waited until one of their parents had died before marrying and raising a new generation. As long as both parents were alive, the addition of another mouth to feed would have put a strain on the family’s resources. As soon as one of the parents falls ill, however, the grown son or daughter must contemplate marriage to a partner who will replace the dying parent on the farm. There probably is not much sentiment involved in such matches. If the priest is to be believed, his parishioners marry only out of calculation. They do not worry about the bride’s pretty face, they ask only how many sheep she will bring into the family. Sexual need probably does not influence the decision very much either, since promiscuity at an early age is a trademark of Sennely’s young. Outsiders comment on this, some expressing shock. The boys and girls of Sennely, it seems, do not need to wait for marriage. They pet and kiss and fondle each other freely. Marriage, in this perspective, is business rather than pleasure.



The new family, founded in the shadow of death, is a partnership established for the purpose of continuing the timeless battle against hunger and solitude. It is not a very solid partnership. It will be broken up by the death of one of the partners within ten years or so. Just time enough to have a baby in the first year and several others, at two year intervals—four or five children in all. One or two of these will die of a contagious disease, aided by chronic malnutrition and unsanitary surroundings. When the mother herself dies, often in her early thirties, and usually from complications following childbirth, the widower is left with two or three orphaned children in his care. Almost instantly he finds a new wife. Half the recorded marriages in Sennely are second marriages of this kind. Should both parents fall victim to one of the recurring waves of murderous food shortages accompanied by illness, the children will be taken care of by the village. Orphaned children are not so much absorbed by relatives as by legal guardians appointed by the community. Unless the orphaned children are very young, they may not experience their parents’ death as a profound dislocation, since it was the custom, anyway, especially among the landless families, to hand children over to more prosperous neighbors when they reached the age of seven or eight. They were old enough, by then, to become servants, apprentices, or shepherds. By the time they were 14, they were able to give a full day’s work to their masters, so that caring for an orphaned child was not necessarily a losing proposition.



Few could afford the luxury of sentiment in Sennely. This was a society on a perpetual war footing, mobilized against the inroads of death, closing ranks in the aftermath of catastrophe. The men and women of Sennely were too much concerned with making a bare living and burying their dead, to lavish feelings on each other. Parents were not in a position to care for their children beyond their early years, nor were children prepared to come to the aid of destitute or sickly parents. Orphans were taken care of, not so much out of pity, but because they were human capital. A reasonably healthy orphaned girl, after serving some years as a kitchen maid in her guardians’ household, could look forward to a marriage proposal from an older widower. Not Christian charity or family affection but labor shortages activated social welfare provisions.



Having observed how fragile family bonds seem to be in this village, we are naturally led to ask how the community functions when common action is called for. In what sense does one belong to Sennely? What are the sources of authority here, how are common standards of behavior agreed upon and enforced? To the extent that one can answer these questions one reaches the conviction that authority in Sennely does not have its source in kinship ties. There are no clans, no elders or patriarchs obeyed because of their position within a network of family relations. To the extent that there is a common identity in Sennely, it rests not on blood, birth, or lineage, but on artificial, man-made, deliberate solidarities.



All the families of Sennely, rich or poor, are members of the formal village community. This is a legal entity, capable of borrowing money and raising taxes. Its will is expressed by means of periodic assemblies. Major decisions are made by formal or informal polls of all the heads of household present. Although everyone has the right to speak at village meetings, in practice most assemblies are attended only by the more substantial taxpayers. The village assembly also manages and audits the financial affairs of the local church. It prevents disputes from arising, takes measures to protect the village against marauders, vagrants, and wolves, appoints shepherds for the common herd and a schoolmaster if the village can afford one.



The assembly’s functions are important, but the villagers are more deeply, more emotionally involved in other formal organizations. Although the priest may not be important to the villagers, they view the church as theirs. They feel at home in this building their ancestors built and they maintain. The church and the adjoining cemetery constitute the heart of the community. From the priest’s perspective, the peasants may appear indifferent to religion. Although they do come to hear mass on Sundays, both morning and afternoon, they refuse to come to confession. Neither penitence nor communion interest them. They are baptized at birth, they confess on their deathbed. This is the extent of their participation in the sacraments.



But they do come to church with pleasure. Unlike the village assemblies, which suffer from absenteeism, religious ceremonies bring out the whole village, rich and poor, men, women, and children. Sunday mass is a community event. Everyone is talking while the children chase each other in the aisles. Gossip is exchanged, business deals are made, young men and women eye each other. The peasants of Sennely come together at their church as often as possible, not only on Sundays but on Saturday afternoons too and on all possible holidays. Their social life revolves around the church, spills over into the village square in front of it, and fills the village inn.



Festivities of a private kind, the drinking and eating that punctuate family occasions such as christenings, weddings, and funerals, do keep the inn busy, but they are dwarfed by the banquets and parades organized by the religious brotherhoods. These are clubs, essentially male clubs, whose religious functions are not particularly well defined but whose social purpose is quite clear: the brotherhoods provide solidarities beyond the level of the family. Within a brotherhood, distinctions of wealth and status are forgotten. Laboureur and journalier sit side by side at the banquets and they march together in the parades of which there can be as many as 100 in a given year. The priest opposes these frequent festivities, but he has no choice in the matter. He is an outsider. His stay in the village is of limited duration. He cannot oppose traditions that are centuries old and much dearer to his parishioners than are the teachings of the Church. Not that the villagers were lacking in religious feeling. They had a particular devotion to the Virgin Mary and they offered up prayers to saints of whom they expected something in return. Their devotions were not quite orthodox in character. They venerated a particular saint as long as he proved effective in warding off illness and other disasters. If the saint failed to keep up his side of the bargain, they switched to another. The priest who lived in Sennely from 1676 to 1710—and whose diary is the source of much that we know about this village—did not care for the villagers’ attitude toward religion. They used the church as a community hall, they showed little respect for the priest and little interest in the sacraments. Even though St. John was the official patron saint of Sennely, the villagers chose to pray to St. Sebastian instead. Presumably St. John had disappointed their expectations at some time in the past. While the priest Sauvageon was in residence, the villagers favored St. Sebastian who was reputed to be effective in curing illness. The most popular social organization in Sennely was the brotherhood of St. Sebastian, to which the villagers were willing to pay dues, although they contributed almost nothing to Sunday collections at church.



Religion played a large part in the lives of the peasants, but it was a religion of their own, designed to satisfy local needs. The priest Sauvageon was constantly irritated and frustrated. Had he wished to play a more active part in the village’s religious life, he probably would not have been allowed to do so. His sense of appropriate piety and observances was too much at odds with local tradition. The difference between the priest’s views and those of the villagers was not necessarily the difference between a rigorous and a lax interpretation of Church customs. During Lent, for instance, the villagers did fast. It is just that they went on fasting past the required number of days. They had their own unshakeable sense of what was right. Their favorite social and religious activities were the processions and banquets sponsored by the brotherhoods. The parades involved the whole village. The biggest of these was on Corpus Christi day, when the village street was covered with hay and straw, the church bells rang, and everyone came out dressed in his finery. The parade proceeded to the neighboring village. On this annual occasion, the public festivities served not only to unite the villagers of Sennely, but also to touch base with outsiders. When the procession reached the neighboring village, all the people of both communities attended mass together, after which they visited the cemetery. No religious procession was complete without the banquets and drinking bouts that wound up the big event as darkness fell.



Having spent some time observing a single village, we should now proceed to ask how representative Sennely may be of rural society in Western Europe. In the Kingdom of France alone, at the time when the records allow a reasonably close glimpse of Sennely, there were about 40,000 villages. In the regions of Western Europe as a whole—those, at least, that we are best informed about, including France, England, Spain, Italy, the Low Countries (modern Holland and Belgium), and parts of western Germany—we may be talking about something like 160,000 rural parishes. Each of these surely had its own character. Even so, we should be able to identify some fundamental traits common to most, if not all, of these communities. We will have to proceed cautiously, in later chapters, moving from the watery Sologne, where Sennely lies, to water-poor Hampshire, glancing at villages in the plains of Lorraine and in the high mountains of the Spanish sierras, including Mediterranean settings filled with permanent sunshine as well as Atlantic seashore villages drenched in rain and flavored by the smell of mussel beds and herring catches. Closing our eyes, momentarily, to sharp variations of soil, climate, language, and religion, we shall listen only to the constants, to the invariable realities that should make generalization possible.



As a starting point, I propose two categories that might serve to make sense of the mass of information we shall encounter. Let us call the first of these categories constraints, the second autonomies.



Approaching the scene from the vantage point of a North American or European society in the twentieth century, any seventeenth-century peasant community must give the impression of being hemmed in on all sides by brutal necessity. We see only the constraints in operation. The historian Gerard Bouchard indicates this in his choice of title: Sennely appears to him as an immobile village, where nothing changes and nothing can change. This may be an acceptable summation, not only for one village but for most, if we restrict our analysis to a few basic aspects of material life.



The population of Sennely does not grow. It cannot grow. If we examine the constraints which keep the population in check here, we will find that they are the very same constraints in effect everywhere else in Western Europe. The obstacle to population growth is an invisible barrier constructed out of the ratio between the land available for cultivation and the hunger of human beings.



This barrier was gradually erected over a period of some three hundred years. It was fully in place by the beginning of the fourteenth century. Before that time, no such constraint had existed. People had been scarce, unclaimed lands plentiful. Immense stretches of forest invited clearing. In this happy situation, the population had quadrupled in size, increasing most dramatically in those regions favored by fertile soil, a temperate climate, and easy access. In Christian Europe as a whole, there may have been as many as 65 million people making a living in the early fourteenth century. This was a high-water mark beyond which growth became impossible. This was especially the case in the most densely settled zones, the heartland of medieval Europe. Some 43 million people, out of a total of 65 million, lived in these favored regions which had been part of the Roman empire: Italy, France, the Low Countries, England, and western Germany. Within this preferred region there were clusters of particularly dense settlement in northern Italy, the Paris basin, and Flanders, where the ratio of people to land reached the level of 40, 50, even 80 to the square kilometer. Forests almost vanished. Churches were separated by no more than half an hour’s walk from each other. This pattern of settlement, established by 1300, was not substantially altered before the eighteenth century. 2



Throughout the four centuries we are concerned with in this book, European peasants lived in a straightjacket of their own making. They had multiplied freely and reached limits that could be breached only at the cost of the gravest perils. When vacant land suitable for homesteading was no longer to be had and every village’s wheat fields and vineyards bordered upon another village’s territory, the margin between survival and disaster narrowed dangerously. With too many mouths to feed and no further expansion possible beyond the customary limits of village lands, efforts were made to increase the grain crop within each village’s boundaries. Timber was felled, swamps were drained, meadows were plowed under. Even poor stretches of gravelly soil and rock-strewn hillsides difficult for the plow to handle were requisitioned when the need for bread demanded desperate measures.



Such tactics merely delayed the inevitable catastrophe. Every one of these expedients was shown to be imprudent in the long run. With the forests gone, timber and firewood disappeared. Every acre of meadowland put under the plow reduced opportunities for grazing. Livestock herds shrank in size. Manure, essential for use as fertilizer, became scarce and the yields of the grain fields, already low in normal times, became even lower. Marginal land put under cultivation barely repaid the investment in seed. Unless new farming techniques could be introduced, to increase productivity, there was only one possible solution to the impasse—and that would have been to reduce the population. Increasing productivity proved impossible. Now the slightest frost, an invasion of locusts, a fever carrying off a few cows sufficed to upset the balance. Chronic malnutrition weakened resistance to disease. Small waves of famine and local epidemics prepared the way for the catastrophic epidemic of bubonic plague which broke out in the summer of 1347, racing northward from the Mediterranean faster than a forest fire. The Black Death, as it came to be known, destroyed perhaps as much as one third of the population within months.



For the survivors, land was plentiful again. Labor shortages were acute. Cattle went untended. Forests grew again. Several generations would be born, would reproduce, would die, before the murderous damages of 1347-48 were repaired. One hundred and fifty years later the population had not yet regained its medieval level. In the course of the sixteenth century, at last, the 60 million mark was passed and growth continued cautiously, shying away from dramatic increases. The pattern set in the fourteenth century was to remain in effect. Population could grow only so much without inviting famine and disease. The most fundamental constraint was now securely in place.



In some measure, the brakes were applied by impersonal forces: viruses, bacteria, rodents, insects, bad weather, the ravages of war. The plague remained endemic until 1721. Other diseases took their threatening turn: syphilis, smallpox, typhus, influenza. But there never was a catastrophe again to approach the scale of the holocaust of 1347. Famine, the great scourge, continued to hover near enough, inspiring fear, a wolf at the door baring its teeth in the dead season. But famines became less threatening in time. After 1700, its pressures became less frequent, less severe, pushed back into pockets of badlands. One cannot escape the suspicion that Europeans had learned to live within the constraints imposed by inflexible harvests. The evidence in Sennely and elsewhere confirms this suspicion.



Sennely, even though cursed with poor grain lands, managed to avoid major famines and epidemics. How? By keeping a low profile, by making sure that its population was not allowed to exceed its resources. The number of families making a living within the confines of Sennely’s territory was not subject to variation. The land could support only about 50 farms. These farms could not be subdivided. Each of them constituted a balanced portfolio of securities, of separate lines of defense: grain, vegetables, orchards, grazing, ponds. Some properties were more profitable than others, but none was abundant enough to overcome the peasants’ caution: the farms had to be kept whole. Any diminution of these units of production was an invitation to catastrophe.



Having more than two or three children would upset the balance. Each generation’s goal was to replace itself without adding to the number of mouths to feed. This goal was achieved by delaying marriage until there was room on the farm for a new couple and their eventual children. The death of a parent activated the son’s or daughter’s marriage. If the new couple proved too fertile, if Fate showed too much kindness to their infant children, so that more than two or three survived infancy, then the parents might well arrange to hire the surplus children out to more prosperous farmers who could use extra help. The larger farms could feed more people than the bare minimum of two adults and two children. It was only because of these larger farms that Sennely could support the landless half of its population, the hired hands, the servant girls, the shepherds who worked for little more than their daily bread.



What we are looking at is an artfully balanced social organization. The men and women of Sennely understood and accepted the limits of their resources and learned to live within these limits. Long ago, when land was plentiful and people scarce, there had been no need for such cautious ways. No doubt the girls had married earlier then and families had been larger. But since the fourteenth century, grim lessons had been learned. Sennely had accepted the new way of dealing with scarcity. Like all the other peasant communities in Western Europe—at least those whose records have been studied so far—Sennely had declared its independence from worldwide, instinctive patterns of behavior. Instead of bearing children as soon as they were nubile, the girls of Sennely accepted the constraint imposed by need. They delayed marriage and childbearing for as long as might be necessary to insure their future children’s subsistence. For some girls that time might never come. They were prepared to conceive only when an offer of marriage was made. Such offers were contingent upon the inheritance of the family land.



Delayed marriage may have been the most important element within the social system created by European peasants after the fourteenth century. It is, in any case, the most readily identifiable one. By delaying marriage, European peasants set a course that separated them from the rest of the world’s inhabitants. As early as 1377, in a very large sample from England, the trend is visible. Of all the girls over the age of 14—and therefore presumably capable of conceiving—only 67 percent were married and bearing children. That proportion would be down to 55 percent in the seventeenth century. Outside of Western Europe, so far as such calculations can be made, the proportion of nubile girls who actually married and conceived would be close to 90 percent. 3 A rough summation of the discoveries made by historical demographers would be to say that European peasants adapted to scarce resources by limiting potential births by as much as 50 percent through unnaturally late marriage and conception. In so doing they bowed to constraints, but they also achieved a degree of autonomy.



AFTER THE BLACK DEATH, by George Huppert; Indiana Univ. Pr., 1998. <http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/asin/0253211808>;
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The Economist Has no Clothes

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Edited by Neal Grout, Thursday, 18 Mar 2010, 18:40

A good look at economics and the pseudoscience that supports it.

http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=the-economist-has-no-clothes

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Activating Blog

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Edited by Neal Grout, Sunday, 18 Oct 2009, 21:38

Hi,

If you've got this far then welcome to my OU blog. I do have another blog but that is mainly for staying in touch with family.

Excuse the first post but I quite often find handy or interesting pieces of information which I then store for digest later if I'm busy. Therefore you may find in the future strange posts that don't seem to fit in with the rest.

Anyway this was just to say I am activating this blog so I can chart how well things are going through the course

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SOCIAL STATUS AND HEALTH IN HUMANS AND OTHER ANIMALS

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Edited by Neal Grout, Sunday, 18 Oct 2009, 21:38
SOCIAL STATUS AND HEALTH IN HUMANS AND OTHER ANIMALS

Robert M. Sapolsky

Departments of Biological Sciences, Neurology, and Neurological Sciences,
Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305-5020; Institute of Primate
Research, National Museums of Kenya, Karen, Nairobi, Kenya; email:
sapolsky@...

Abstract

Abstract Dominance hierarchies exist in numerous social species, and rank in
such hierarchies can dramatically influence the quality of an individual's
life. Rank can dramatically influence also the health of an individual,
particularly with respect to stress-related disease. This chapter reviews
first the nature of stress, the stress response and stress-related disease,
as well as the varieties of hierarchical systems in animals. I then review
the literature derived from nonhuman species concerning the connections
between rank and functioning of the adrenocortical, cardiovascular,
reproductive, and immune systems. As shown here, the relationship is
anything but monolithic. Finally, I consider whether rank is a relevant
concept in humans and argue that socioeconomic status (SES) is the nearest
human approximation to social rank and that SES dramatically influences
health.

INTRODUCTION
http://academic.reed.edu/biology/professors/srenn/pages/teaching/2008_syllab
us/2008_readings/9_sapolsky_2004_stress.pdf
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