Edited by Chris Colquitt, Friday, 2 Nov 2018, 15:42
Before we start, I'd like to say thanks for taking the time to read this post. I know yesterday was a pretty tiring day for you and certainly didn't finish the way you expected it to start! But hey, sometimes people can surprise you - no matter how long you've known them, I suppose!
Barnum statements similar to these ones can become something of an art. Used well, they can elevate a mentalists stage show or turn a mediocre executive summary into a good one*! But knowing exactly what's going on in the mind of the person opposite us isn't a party trick - it's a well evolved set of mechanisms that we're still only beginning to understand.
Since Premack and Woodruff (1978) coined the term, 'theory of mind' has been used to describe a human's ability to understand the view and beliefs of others, even if we do not share them. Applied by Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith in 1985, theory of mind became one of the leading (though not only)** explanations of the social deficits most commonly seen in sufferers of autistic spectrum disorders. Here, the authors described, people with autism found it increasingly difficult to understand the alternative viewpoints and beliefs held by others. Instead, they saw knowledge as a shared commodity, experienced by all as soon as it was experienced by one.
Most commonly shown through 'false belief tasks' such as the Sally-Anne doll test or the Maxie test, we regularly see autism expressed as an inability to see another's point of view. In the Sally-Anne test, autism sufferers suggested the dolls could magically understand where the marble had been moved to. In the Maxie test, others magically knew a tube was full of pencils and not chocolate. All the time, this knowledge was 'shared' to naive participants because the autistic participant is unable to apply a mental separation between themselves and others.
The biological basis of Theory of Mind
Current research into the causes of individual difference in ability within theory of mind is underway and a large area of focus. Schulte-Ruther, et al. (2006) showed how 'mirror neurons' in a number of brain regions correlated well with use of empathetic skills. These mirror neurons are commonly implicated in learning motor skills from others, but we're now understanding that they have additional responsibilities for the understanding (and replicating) of the emotions of other people. This is a core facet of empathy.
Theory of mind, proposals and bidding
Little research has been done in the area of empathy, theory of mind or the effects of autism in the world of corporate sales. For my colleagues at the APMP and London School of Economics, this presents a valuable line of enquiry, asking questions such as:
Are individuals with autism disorders such as Asperger's fairly represented in the bidding and proposal community? Does autism represent a blocker to the bidding profession, or are there processes we can put in place to facilitate effectiveness of autistic individuals within the industry?
To what extent does competitive intelligence require a theory of mind? How is ToM used in negotiations, in competitive pricing scenarios and in forming strategic partnerships with other organizations?
To what extent to other disorders of empathy or ToM affect senior sales professionals (such as psychopathy***).
How can proposals better support an alignment of minds through design, writing, mirroring of goals and aims and more.
To what extent should proposals stay away from ToM processes? When should a good proposal stick to the facts instead of trying to mind-read it's buyer?
Are you a successful (or unsuccessful) salesperson with an autism or empathy disorder? If so: I'd love to have a brief chat with you for a future edition of these blogs.
What applications for Theory of Mind do you see in corporate sales, bids and proposals? How often do you need to read the mind of your buyer, or even your seller? I welcome you to leave a comment below!
*Note: to turn a good executive summary into a great one, avoid Barnum statements altogether and use true facts that show a demonstrable understanding of your customer and their objectives!
**Note: There are numerous gaps in the ToM explanation of autism that are still debated to this day. ToM does not explain the physical characteristics of autism (such as repetitive behaviour), nor does it provide a suitable neurobiological mechanism for the disorders. Other disorders, such as developmental disorders, can produce similar lapses in interpersonal abilities as autism.
***Note: Much has been written in the pop-sales community about the presence of so-called 'psychopathic traits' of salespeople and senior executives. These narratives are rarely based around good science and tend to use misinterpreted definitions of psychopathy. For a good summary of the medical definitions of psychopathy, and how they apply to interpersonal relationships, please see my blog coming in a few weeks).
References:
Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith (1985), 'Does the autistic child have a "theory of mind?". Cognition v.21. Issue 1. pp. 37-46
Premack & Woodruff (1978), 'Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?'. Behavioural and brain sciences, v1. issue 4. pp. 515-526
Schulte-Ruther, et al. (2007), 'Mirror Neuron and Theory of Mind Mechanisms Involved in Face-to-Face Interactions: A Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Approach to Empathy'. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, v19. issue 8, pp.1354-1372
Wimmer & Perner (1983), 'Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children’s understanding of deception'. Cognition, vol.13, pp.103-128
We're not mindreaders (or are we?)
Before we start, I'd like to say thanks for taking the time to read this post. I know yesterday was a pretty tiring day for you and certainly didn't finish the way you expected it to start! But hey, sometimes people can surprise you - no matter how long you've known them, I suppose!
Barnum statements similar to these ones can become something of an art. Used well, they can elevate a mentalists stage show or turn a mediocre executive summary into a good one*! But knowing exactly what's going on in the mind of the person opposite us isn't a party trick - it's a well evolved set of mechanisms that we're still only beginning to understand.
Since Premack and Woodruff (1978) coined the term, 'theory of mind' has been used to describe a human's ability to understand the view and beliefs of others, even if we do not share them. Applied by Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith in 1985, theory of mind became one of the leading (though not only)** explanations of the social deficits most commonly seen in sufferers of autistic spectrum disorders. Here, the authors described, people with autism found it increasingly difficult to understand the alternative viewpoints and beliefs held by others. Instead, they saw knowledge as a shared commodity, experienced by all as soon as it was experienced by one.
Most commonly shown through 'false belief tasks' such as the Sally-Anne doll test or the Maxie test, we regularly see autism expressed as an inability to see another's point of view. In the Sally-Anne test, autism sufferers suggested the dolls could magically understand where the marble had been moved to. In the Maxie test, others magically knew a tube was full of pencils and not chocolate. All the time, this knowledge was 'shared' to naive participants because the autistic participant is unable to apply a mental separation between themselves and others.
The biological basis of Theory of Mind
Current research into the causes of individual difference in ability within theory of mind is underway and a large area of focus. Schulte-Ruther, et al. (2006) showed how 'mirror neurons' in a number of brain regions correlated well with use of empathetic skills. These mirror neurons are commonly implicated in learning motor skills from others, but we're now understanding that they have additional responsibilities for the understanding (and replicating) of the emotions of other people. This is a core facet of empathy.
Theory of mind, proposals and bidding
Little research has been done in the area of empathy, theory of mind or the effects of autism in the world of corporate sales. For my colleagues at the APMP and London School of Economics, this presents a valuable line of enquiry, asking questions such as:
Are you a successful (or unsuccessful) salesperson with an autism or empathy disorder? If so: I'd love to have a brief chat with you for a future edition of these blogs.
What applications for Theory of Mind do you see in corporate sales, bids and proposals? How often do you need to read the mind of your buyer, or even your seller? I welcome you to leave a comment below!
*Note: to turn a good executive summary into a great one, avoid Barnum statements altogether and use true facts that show a demonstrable understanding of your customer and their objectives!
**Note: There are numerous gaps in the ToM explanation of autism that are still debated to this day. ToM does not explain the physical characteristics of autism (such as repetitive behaviour), nor does it provide a suitable neurobiological mechanism for the disorders. Other disorders, such as developmental disorders, can produce similar lapses in interpersonal abilities as autism.
***Note: Much has been written in the pop-sales community about the presence of so-called 'psychopathic traits' of salespeople and senior executives. These narratives are rarely based around good science and tend to use misinterpreted definitions of psychopathy. For a good summary of the medical definitions of psychopathy, and how they apply to interpersonal relationships, please see my blog coming in a few weeks).
References:
Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith (1985), 'Does the autistic child have a "theory of mind?". Cognition v.21. Issue 1. pp. 37-46
Premack & Woodruff (1978), 'Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?'. Behavioural and brain sciences, v1. issue 4. pp. 515-526
Schulte-Ruther, et al. (2007), 'Mirror Neuron and Theory of Mind Mechanisms Involved in Face-to-Face Interactions: A Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Approach to Empathy'. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, v19. issue 8, pp.1354-1372
Wimmer & Perner (1983), 'Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children’s understanding of deception'. Cognition, vol.13, pp.103-128