Edited by Samuel George Gaze, Thursday, 22 Dec 2022, 18:50
In the last part of this blog, I look whether moral foundations theory makes any contributions to actual questions of morality and ethics, and if it is a valuable lens to examine ethical questions. Haidt himself is at pains to point out that MFT is a descriptive theory, not a normative one, that is we can't conclude anything about what is morally relevant from the description of what people's intuitions are about what is right or wrong. And this unwillingness to advance his theory as a moral philosophy is directly connected by Haidt to the realisation that taking moral discourses of sanctity, authority and loyalty (perhaps also tradition) as seriously as care and fairness seems to vindicate, if not the Nazis, but fascism as a moral system specially adapted for humanity. Perhaps this is why Haidt also developed a 'liberty/oppression' dimension that would counter the structuralist tendencies of his theory.
However I think there are normative consequences implied in Moral Foundations Theory, just from the definition of morality as something that developed to help humans live in large social groups. Such a groupish sense of morality is necessary for us to be able to survive together, and so we should be wary of moral philosophies that downplay the foundations of sanctity, authority and loyalty, such as the utilitarian philosophies of Bentham and Mill. These theories tend to try to reduce morality to concern for harms to individuals, when the whole of morality is meant to protect the group from harms, even if it means the individual suffers in some cases. Following these more individualist moralities as 'liberals' wish to would result in the disintegration of society.
I've tried to answer the question of whether or not this is a realistic fear or not in the section on the sociological theory - but to recap, it isn't that liberals have abandoned their moral foundations, or simply ignore questions of proportional fairness, sacred symbolism, loyalty or functional hierarchy, it is just that these discourses have different content, or are approached in a different way that gives a little more weight to the question of harm. The differences between the groups could very well be artefacts of the survey, social identity or of the groups different positions in the larger social system. There is no evidence that the particular content of liberal moral discourse is dangerous for society, because Haidt does not analyse the discourse.
Instead, the psychologist Joshua Green has argued in his book Moral Tribes, that we are actually confronted with quite different moral questions than those answered by our hunter gatherer ancestors, and even different questions to those that were posed in 19th century democracies. We now have to consider not just how to co-operate with other individuals or families in a tribe or nation, but how to co-ordinate co-operation between different national groups or 'moral tribes.' We are faced with moral questions that result from globalisation, having the cheap labour of the global south produce our comfortable standard of living here, what and if anything can be done about it. Haidt's MFT is somewhat locked into groupishness, which doesn't give us much hope for future co-operation on peace and climate action.
Even the core of moral intuitions theory leaves us with reasons to be pessimistic; if we cannot adjust our behaviour as a result of the information we have rationally gathered from our experience of the environment because we have intransigent intuitions, then we cannot alter the seemingly disastrous course we are taking towards ecological breakdown or nuclear war. It may be correct, as Haidt argues from Hume and cognitive psychology, that decisions become impossible if we do not feel any emotions behind them, but that does not take any force away from the necessity to rationally consider if the emotions we feel are serving us or not. It may be that to adapt to the moral challenges of our time, rationality is the tool we need to develop to correctly understand the threats and opportunities ahead.
One way rationality can help I heard outlined briefly by social psychologist John Jost; which is that it helps us to weigh up which of our emotions are more important to us. Haidt's theory implies that each of the foundations could be equally important, however there is neither reason or evidence to show that this is the case. It may be that theories that reduce morality to preventing harm go a little too far, but it also may be the case that in order to overcome collective action problems like building human societies, members need to feel like they will be cared for more than being safe from moral disgust. The ability to care for those beyond the group maybe the moral foundation for a more cohesive global response to the challenges of climate breakdown and nuclear war.
Jost also points to the arbitrariness of Haidt's moral foundations, something I understand as the lack of a necessary connection between a foundation and any particular form of behaviour. This presents a more philosophical problem with the concept of separate moral foundations; just pointing out the different flavours of morality doesn't give us examples for any of them of what right moral conduct would be. For example, in Judaism and Islam, it is unholy (not sacred) to eat pork, yet in China pork is seen as a cleaner meat than other kinds, while in the west, where eating pork has not been traditionally considered a moral issue, vegetarianism is now a moral debate about fairness and cruelty to animals.
Consider the different ways that social distancing was talked about in public discourse during the COVID pandemic. On the one hand, failure to social distance could be constructed as uncaring, disloyal to the nation or community, dirty and deadly, unfair to others, disobedient or even oppressive (depriving someone's right to life). On the other hand, social distancing could be construed as uncaring (anti-social for families and friends), disloyal (to the church or the national character), unfair, weak, oppressive, and perhaps even disobedient to god or morally degrading to the human spirit. Moral discourse is tricky and certainly deserving of further study.
My conclusion, to this section and the general argument of Moral Foundations Theory, is that social science cannot be complacent about human nature. Yes, undoubtedly we are animals on the inside, and much more of our life and behaviour is controlled by automatic processes that we barely understand. Further our social systems have their own logic which is often slippery and difficult to theorise about, if only because doing so can lead to changes in those very systems. As animals that are conscious of our surroundings, capable of integrating information to make changes to our world, we are a dynamic system that relies on our reason to at least shine a light on the way we are headed. We are now, as writer Yuval Harari argues, due to advances in biotechnology and AI, heading towards a moment in which we may even be able to ask the question "what should we want to want?" Undoubtedly the moral questions we are confronted with cannot be answered just with the blind instincts that evolution has equipped us with.
Moral Foundations Theory as a Theory of Ethics
In the last part of this blog, I look whether moral foundations theory makes any contributions to actual questions of morality and ethics, and if it is a valuable lens to examine ethical questions. Haidt himself is at pains to point out that MFT is a descriptive theory, not a normative one, that is we can't conclude anything about what is morally relevant from the description of what people's intuitions are about what is right or wrong. And this unwillingness to advance his theory as a moral philosophy is directly connected by Haidt to the realisation that taking moral discourses of sanctity, authority and loyalty (perhaps also tradition) as seriously as care and fairness seems to vindicate, if not the Nazis, but fascism as a moral system specially adapted for humanity. Perhaps this is why Haidt also developed a 'liberty/oppression' dimension that would counter the structuralist tendencies of his theory.
However I think there are normative consequences implied in Moral Foundations Theory, just from the definition of morality as something that developed to help humans live in large social groups. Such a groupish sense of morality is necessary for us to be able to survive together, and so we should be wary of moral philosophies that downplay the foundations of sanctity, authority and loyalty, such as the utilitarian philosophies of Bentham and Mill. These theories tend to try to reduce morality to concern for harms to individuals, when the whole of morality is meant to protect the group from harms, even if it means the individual suffers in some cases. Following these more individualist moralities as 'liberals' wish to would result in the disintegration of society.
I've tried to answer the question of whether or not this is a realistic fear or not in the section on the sociological theory - but to recap, it isn't that liberals have abandoned their moral foundations, or simply ignore questions of proportional fairness, sacred symbolism, loyalty or functional hierarchy, it is just that these discourses have different content, or are approached in a different way that gives a little more weight to the question of harm. The differences between the groups could very well be artefacts of the survey, social identity or of the groups different positions in the larger social system. There is no evidence that the particular content of liberal moral discourse is dangerous for society, because Haidt does not analyse the discourse.
Instead, the psychologist Joshua Green has argued in his book Moral Tribes, that we are actually confronted with quite different moral questions than those answered by our hunter gatherer ancestors, and even different questions to those that were posed in 19th century democracies. We now have to consider not just how to co-operate with other individuals or families in a tribe or nation, but how to co-ordinate co-operation between different national groups or 'moral tribes.' We are faced with moral questions that result from globalisation, having the cheap labour of the global south produce our comfortable standard of living here, what and if anything can be done about it. Haidt's MFT is somewhat locked into groupishness, which doesn't give us much hope for future co-operation on peace and climate action.
Even the core of moral intuitions theory leaves us with reasons to be pessimistic; if we cannot adjust our behaviour as a result of the information we have rationally gathered from our experience of the environment because we have intransigent intuitions, then we cannot alter the seemingly disastrous course we are taking towards ecological breakdown or nuclear war. It may be correct, as Haidt argues from Hume and cognitive psychology, that decisions become impossible if we do not feel any emotions behind them, but that does not take any force away from the necessity to rationally consider if the emotions we feel are serving us or not. It may be that to adapt to the moral challenges of our time, rationality is the tool we need to develop to correctly understand the threats and opportunities ahead.
One way rationality can help I heard outlined briefly by social psychologist John Jost; which is that it helps us to weigh up which of our emotions are more important to us. Haidt's theory implies that each of the foundations could be equally important, however there is neither reason or evidence to show that this is the case. It may be that theories that reduce morality to preventing harm go a little too far, but it also may be the case that in order to overcome collective action problems like building human societies, members need to feel like they will be cared for more than being safe from moral disgust. The ability to care for those beyond the group maybe the moral foundation for a more cohesive global response to the challenges of climate breakdown and nuclear war.
Jost also points to the arbitrariness of Haidt's moral foundations, something I understand as the lack of a necessary connection between a foundation and any particular form of behaviour. This presents a more philosophical problem with the concept of separate moral foundations; just pointing out the different flavours of morality doesn't give us examples for any of them of what right moral conduct would be. For example, in Judaism and Islam, it is unholy (not sacred) to eat pork, yet in China pork is seen as a cleaner meat than other kinds, while in the west, where eating pork has not been traditionally considered a moral issue, vegetarianism is now a moral debate about fairness and cruelty to animals.
Consider the different ways that social distancing was talked about in public discourse during the COVID pandemic. On the one hand, failure to social distance could be constructed as uncaring, disloyal to the nation or community, dirty and deadly, unfair to others, disobedient or even oppressive (depriving someone's right to life). On the other hand, social distancing could be construed as uncaring (anti-social for families and friends), disloyal (to the church or the national character), unfair, weak, oppressive, and perhaps even disobedient to god or morally degrading to the human spirit. Moral discourse is tricky and certainly deserving of further study.
My conclusion, to this section and the general argument of Moral Foundations Theory, is that social science cannot be complacent about human nature. Yes, undoubtedly we are animals on the inside, and much more of our life and behaviour is controlled by automatic processes that we barely understand. Further our social systems have their own logic which is often slippery and difficult to theorise about, if only because doing so can lead to changes in those very systems. As animals that are conscious of our surroundings, capable of integrating information to make changes to our world, we are a dynamic system that relies on our reason to at least shine a light on the way we are headed. We are now, as writer Yuval Harari argues, due to advances in biotechnology and AI, heading towards a moment in which we may even be able to ask the question "what should we want to want?" Undoubtedly the moral questions we are confronted with cannot be answered just with the blind instincts that evolution has equipped us with.