I’m pleased to share with my fellow Open University colleagues that my recent article has been accepted for publication on arXiv.org.
This paper presents a study into an econometric analysis of competitive equilibria through the lens of static game theory. Specifically, it applies Bertrand's duopoly framework—where prices converge to marginal cost at equilibrium—to illustrate how Pareto efficiency can arise when forbearance emerges as a strategic profile under conditions of incomplete information.
🚨🚨 New arXiv e-print announcement 🚨🚨
I’m pleased to share with my fellow Open University colleagues that my recent article has been accepted for publication on arXiv.org.
This paper presents a study into an econometric analysis of competitive equilibria through the lens of static game theory. Specifically, it applies Bertrand's duopoly framework—where prices converge to marginal cost at equilibrium—to illustrate how Pareto efficiency can arise when forbearance emerges as a strategic profile under conditions of incomplete information.
🔗 Read the full article here: https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.22825