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Notes on Butler (The Self as Primitive Concept)

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Edited by Terry O'Sullivan, Thursday 20 October 2011 at 14:08

Butler responded to Locke on identity in an essay Of Personal Identity published 1736.

 

-- our future existence a really important question - but [Locke's] overcomplicated issue of personal identity

-- it's obvious: '..by reflection upon that which is my self now, and that which was my self twenty years ago, I discern tht they are not two, but one and the same self' (Butler, 2008 [1736], p. 281)

-- consciousness of past makes us aware of our identity, but it does not constitute our identity -- 'any more than knowledge, in any other case, can constitute truth, which it presupposes' (ibid)

-- present consciousness of our past actions is not necessary to make us the same persons who committed them -- we just are, whether we remember them or not!

-- 'same' is a tricky concept. E.g. the same tree standing there for 50 years is actually a different tree but we know what we mean when we say it. But philosophically speaking the tree now is not the same as it was. Substance and therefore properties are different. [not sure about this following bit though] -- when we say sameness in a plant means the same life going on in the same organisation through potentially variable particles of , the word 'same' does not mean 'same' when applied to matter [my problem here is that plants are made of matter are they not?] So loosely we are OK to say the plant is the same (life and organisation continue) 'But in a strict and philosophical manner of speech, no man, no being, no mode of being, no anything, can be the same with that with which it has indeed nothing the same' Argues therefore that personal identity cannot remain the same through changed substance.

-- but, B argues, Locke [in spite of his care to separate substance from person!] implies that person is the same substance, person= 'a thinking intelligent being', and personal identity = 'the sameness of a rational being' quoted from L apparently.  Being and Substance are the same thing in this context according to B. We can have different, successive, consciousnesses of our own existence -- but it remains the same existence. 'they are consciousnesses of one and the same thing or object, of the same person, self, or living agent' (ibid, 282).

-- says that L's observations are admittedly hasty, but have been developed by others to the idea that personality is ever changing. 'no one can any more remain one and the same person two moments together than two successive moments can be one and the same moment' (ibid, 283) [although he tries to let Locke off the hook, his phrase 'it is not substance but consciousness alone which constitutes personality' sounds rather like Locke! This view doesn't make sense as it absolves us from responsibility and suggests we should not be concerned with our future [sounds like Parfit?]

1 not consistent with our experience and conduct re self concern.

2 only beings are capable of life and action -- they are the same living beings [subjects] throughout their live, nobody else. Plus you can only be conscious of something that has already happened, which vouches for the existence of the self prior to its consciousness of itself. Plus we are limited in our perceptions so no wonder there are gaps in consciousness!

3 if a person is a substance, then being conscious of personal identity is the same as being conscious of substantial identity [not sure if I get this either! sounds a bit circular] -- similiar argument for if a person is a quality of a substance.

-- finally, casts scorn on doubting continuity of personal identity as it 'it is a question concerning the truth of perception by memory' -- you could doubt perception by other things such as reasoning or deduction. 'For it is ridiculous to attempt to prove th truth of those preceptions whose trught we can no othewise prove than by other perceptions of exactly the same kind with them' (ibid, 284)

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A222

You sound to be enjoying it. I haven't really got into Butler yet.

Good lcuk,

Tony

A picture of Russell Larke

Identity as Structure, Not Memory

Looking back through older posts, the recurring insight is that identity is a property of structure, not of the parts that pass through it. The Butler argument against Locke is structurally sound. Consciousness of past actions presupposes a self that was there to perform them. Memory does not produce the self any more than observation produces the electron. It is a reading, not a cause. The tree example is more instructive than it first appears. The tree is not the same matter, but it is the same organisation. The structure persists through the turnover of particles. Identity is located in the pattern, not the material. Butler's reluctance to accept this for persons is the interesting part. If the self is a living agent, a system with boundaries and continuity, then personal identity is structural identity, not substantial identity. The confusion arises because the observer draws the boundary in the wrong place, looking for a fixed substance where there is only a persistent pattern.
Regards,
Russell Larke
BA (Hons) Business Management | MSc Candidate (Systems Thinking)
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