It is obvious that this perspective is an important contemporary
perspective on the theory of teaching and learning, I have some doubts though about:
The accuracy of its claims to novelty,
particularly given this article’s over-generalised characterisation of earlier theories;
The hyperbolic nature of some of its claims
about the effects of a ‘digital age’.
I want to deal with those reservations first before I
summarise my feeling that this is an unnecessary contribution to a
debate about teaching and learning.
First, the claims are in large unsupported generalisations
and, although there will be partial evidence for all of them, as statements
they mislead. The one I like least, but it is typical of how they all work is: ‘Technology
is altering (rewiring) our brains. The tools we use define and shape our
thinking’.
In as much as the statement about ‘tools’ has substance, it has already been said by
Vygotsky and is not specific to digital technology.
Second, the glib assumption – based entirely on metaphors –
about the relationship between brain and computer technology is more rhetorical than substantive. Even if we forget
the wiring metaphor, the organic connections that explain and facilitate brain plasticity and 'change' do so by living and dying. But change is the only certainty of this
organic process. There is no final knowable end product. Synaptic connections (representing
even behavioural learning) decay if unused or unusable – they leave no
legacy of wires. Hence there is no
case for permanent change that sustains a new brain configuration for a new ‘digital
age’– not on current evidence anyway.
Although behaviourism is a very obviously limited theory,
connectivism cannot (as represented by Siemens) have displaced either
cognitivism or, more importantly, constructivism. The claims against cognitivism are mirrors of Paul Churchland's now embarrassing claims about connectionism, a restored version of behaviourist associationism, as the inevitable successor model of brain process. Yet cognitivism (even 'theory of mind') remains.
As for Vygotsky, Siemens can only
claim the death of constructionism by misrepresenting Vygotsky (almost as if he were Piaget) and the traditions that he engendered.
Although Vygotsky’s notion of the ‘zone of proximal development’ is often
applied to individual learning (as the sole theoretical support for the
notion of ‘scaffolding’ as Bruner would be the first to admit), its implication
is not, as Siemens hints, a theory that suggests that ‘learning occurs inside a
person’.
In fact both the object of learning and the support towards
learning it are entirely representable as external and social in Vygotsky, although they
may admit of internal representation. Likewise internal representations succeed to external or socially shared iconic meanings. Given
that understanding, Siemens adds very little that is new, unlike Engestrom,
whose theories extrapolate from Vygotsky.
The dependence of connectivism on ‘serendipity, innovation and
creativity’ likewise to support a continual process of recognition of new
patterns (another idea from outdated connectionism) in ever growing networks is
also rather romantically and rhetorically organised.
After all recognising and validating
patterns would only seek to stabilise a world of change if that is all learning
was about. In fact change is as dependent on pattern destruction as much as
pattern recognition – hence change is about death as well as new life,
vulnerability as well as confidence in renewal. If it were not, so, change
(which will, of course, happen anyway in one form or another) would not be as
connected as much as it is to pain as well as pleasure. In that sense, Shelley was
right to see the love of change being the ability to embrace the possible (and
possibly disturbing) destruction of patterns you have grown to love, if the new
is to struggle into anything like emergence:
Wild Spirit, which art moving everywhere;
Destroyer and preserver; hear, O hear!
H817 Activity 11: Siemens (2005) on Connectivism
H817 Activity 11: Siemens (2005) on Connectivism (personal thoughts & musings)
It is obvious that this perspective is an important contemporary perspective on the theory of teaching and learning, I have some doubts though about:
The accuracy of its claims to novelty, particularly given this article’s over-generalised characterisation of earlier theories;
The hyperbolic nature of some of its claims about the effects of a ‘digital age’.
I want to deal with those reservations first before I summarise my feeling that this is an unnecessary contribution to a debate about teaching and learning.
First, the claims are in large unsupported generalisations and, although there will be partial evidence for all of them, as statements they mislead. The one I like least, but it is typical of how they all work is: ‘Technology is altering (rewiring) our brains. The tools we use define and shape our thinking’.
In as much as the statement about ‘tools’ has substance, it has already been said by Vygotsky and is not specific to digital technology.
Second, the glib assumption – based entirely on metaphors – about the relationship between brain and computer technology is more rhetorical than substantive. Even if we forget the wiring metaphor, the organic connections that explain and facilitate brain plasticity and 'change' do so by living and dying. But change is the only certainty of this organic process. There is no final knowable end product. Synaptic connections (representing even behavioural learning) decay if unused or unusable – they leave no legacy of wires. Hence there is no case for permanent change that sustains a new brain configuration for a new ‘digital age’– not on current evidence anyway.
Although behaviourism is a very obviously limited theory, connectivism cannot (as represented by Siemens) have displaced either cognitivism or, more importantly, constructivism. The claims against cognitivism are mirrors of Paul Churchland's now embarrassing claims about connectionism, a restored version of behaviourist associationism, as the inevitable successor model of brain process. Yet cognitivism (even 'theory of mind') remains.
As for Vygotsky, Siemens can only claim the death of constructionism by misrepresenting Vygotsky (almost as if he were Piaget) and the traditions that he engendered. Although Vygotsky’s notion of the ‘zone of proximal development’ is often applied to individual learning (as the sole theoretical support for the notion of ‘scaffolding’ as Bruner would be the first to admit), its implication is not, as Siemens hints, a theory that suggests that ‘learning occurs inside a person’.
In fact both the object of learning and the support towards learning it are entirely representable as external and social in Vygotsky, although they may admit of internal representation. Likewise internal representations succeed to external or socially shared iconic meanings. Given that understanding, Siemens adds very little that is new, unlike Engestrom, whose theories extrapolate from Vygotsky.
The dependence of connectivism on ‘serendipity, innovation and creativity’ likewise to support a continual process of recognition of new patterns (another idea from outdated connectionism) in ever growing networks is also rather romantically and rhetorically organised.
After all recognising and validating patterns would only seek to stabilise a world of change if that is all learning was about. In fact change is as dependent on pattern destruction as much as pattern recognition – hence change is about death as well as new life, vulnerability as well as confidence in renewal. If it were not, so, change (which will, of course, happen anyway in one form or another) would not be as connected as much as it is to pain as well as pleasure. In that sense, Shelley was right to see the love of change being the ability to embrace the possible (and possibly disturbing) destruction of patterns you have grown to love, if the new is to struggle into anything like emergence:
Wild Spirit, which art moving everywhere;
Destroyer and preserver; hear, O hear!