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Why Do Bid-Ask Spreads Widen? Adverse Selection, Market Depth, and Liquidity Risk

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Edited by Russell Larke, Wednesday 28 October 2026 at 11:35

Why Do Bid-Ask Spreads Widen? Adverse Selection, Market Depth, and Liquidity Risk

TL;DR: Key Structural Takeaways
  • Spreads are Dynamic, Not Static: The bid-ask spread is not a fixed transaction cost; it is a dynamic variable that widens to protect market makers from risk.
  • Adverse Selection is the Driver: Market makers widen spreads when they perceive a higher risk of trading against an informed participant. This is the structural defence against information asymmetry.
  • Liquidity is Depth, Not Volume: High volume does not mean high liquidity. True liquidity is measured by market depth—the ability to absorb large orders without catastrophic slippage.
  • Liquidity Evaporates Under Stress: When volatility spikes, algorithms withdraw their quotes simultaneously, creating a liquidity vacuum precisely when participants need it most.

Abstract

As established in my previous analysis of The Market Maker as Infrastructure, the bid-ask spread is the foundational price of immediacy in financial markets. However, the structural reality of the spread is not static. This article examines the dynamics of spread widening through the lens of systems thinking. By analysing the mechanics of adverse selection, the difference between market depth and volume, and the reflexive withdrawal of algorithmic liquidity during periods of stress, we can understand why the cost of immediacy increases dramatically just when market participants need it most. This analysis forms part of my broader research into market mechanics and participant constraints.

1. The Price of Immediacy and the Mechanics of the Spread

Every trade requires a buyer and a seller, but they rarely want to trade at the exact same time. The bid-ask spread is the gap between the highest price a buyer is willing to pay (the bid) and the lowest price a seller is willing to accept (the ask).

When a participant submits a market order (as discussed in my previous analysis of order types and execution mechanics), they are crossing the spread. They are demanding immediacy. The difference between the mid-price and the execution price is the fee they pay to the market maker for providing that immediacy. As I discuss in my analysis of what market maker moves actually tell you, the market maker is not providing this service for free; they are managing inventory risk. The spread is the compensation for taking on the risk that the market moves against them before they can offset the trade.

2. Adverse Selection: Why Spreads Widen

The spread is not a fixed number; it is a dynamic variable that responds directly to perceived risk. As Glosten and Milgrom (1985) demonstrated, market makers face adverse selection. If the market maker buys from someone with superior information, the price will likely drop; if they sell to them, it will likely rise.

To protect themselves, market makers widen the spread when they perceive a higher probability of trading against informed order flow. This structural mechanism is why spreads widen dramatically right before major news events, earnings announcements, or during periods of high volatility. The market maker is increasing the cost of immediacy because the information asymmetry in the market has increased. It also explains why spoofing and fake orders are so damaging—they trick the market maker into mispricing this structural risk.

3. Market Depth: The Illusion of Volume

The most common mistake in market analysis is confusing volume with liquidity. A stock can trade millions of shares a day (high volume) but still be highly illiquid if the order book is thin (low depth).

Market depth refers to the number of shares available at each price level in the order book. Deep markets can absorb large orders without moving the price significantly. Thin markets, conversely, are structurally fragile. A single large market order in a thin market will "walk the book," clearing out the available bids or asks and causing rapid price movement. As I outline in my guide on how to choose the best trading platform, access to Level 2 data (which shows this depth) is essential for any participant trading size. Without it, you are trading blind to the actual constraints of the market.

4. The Liquidity Vacuum: Reading the Tape Under Stress

The order book and the time-and-sales feed (the tape) are the raw data of market microstructure. Reading them is not about finding patterns; it is about assessing structural constraints.

When you look at the order book, you are looking at the intentions of other participants. A large resting limit order might indicate a structural wall of supply or demand. However, as discussed in my previous article on order routing, the visible order book is only part of the picture. Much of the true liquidity is hidden in dark pools or internalised by wholesalers.

During periods of extreme stress, this hidden liquidity evaporates. HFT algorithms pull their quotes, and dark pool matching slows down. The tape reading process is about synthesising the visible depth with the actual executed trades to determine if the current price is structurally supported or if it is resting on thin air. When the spread widens rapidly, it is a systemic signal that the market's ability to absorb risk has fundamentally deteriorated.

5. Conclusion

The bid-ask spread is the structural bridge between supply and demand. It is the price of immediacy and the market maker's defence against adverse selection. By moving beyond the simplistic view of volume and focusing on market depth, participants can assess the true fragility of the environment. Liquidity is a system property, not a constant, and the widening of the spread is the clearest signal that the system is under stress.

In the next article, we will examine the mechanics of leverage and margin, exploring how structural constraints amplify forced selling.

References

  • Glosten, L. R., & Milgrom, P. R. (1985). Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders. Journal of Financial Economics, 14(1), 71-100.
  • Kyle, A. S. (1985). Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica, 53(6), 1315-1335.

About the Author

Russell Larke is a financial market structure researcher and systems thinker, currently completing an MSc in Systems Thinking in Practice at the Open University. He is the founder of Trading Beyond Charts.

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