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Alfred Anate Bodurin Mayaki

On-the-job search, wage posting, and wage inflation

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Edited by Alfred Anate Bodurin Mayaki, Thursday 2 October 2025 at 13:06

Overview

Inflation: Drivers and Dynamics 2025 Conference – Speakers

The speaker evaluates a paper on wage-setting and on-the-job search, focusing on whether cost-of-living shocks can trigger wage-price spirals. They accept the importance of on-the-job search for wage inflation but argue the model’s wage-posting assumption removes key bargaining channels. They contrast three mechanisms for wage-price spirals and present evidence from a job-ladder model and Danish tax reform to assess which mechanisms align with observed data.

Evidence linking quits and on-the-job search to wage inflation

  • Quits correlate with wage inflation better than unemployment.
  • Hiring flows: 50% of people hired have a job; 25% are recalls (maternity/paternity returns); 25% come from unemployment.
  • Implication: Understanding wage inflation requires understanding how wages are bargained by employed workers; the speaker “buys that.”

Model assumptions and wage-setting dynamics

  • Frictional labor market with random search and a representative firm that posts wages, implying one wage in equilibrium.
  • No wage motive for on-the-job search; workers switch jobs due to exogenous preference shocks. Turnover is separate from wages.
  • Firm’s trade-off: higher posted wage vs. lower quit probability. If quit probability changes, the equilibrium wage changes.

Cost-of-living shock in the model

  • For wages to rise after a cost-of-living shock, quits must increase.
  • Labor supply channel: Workers could search more, but on-the-job search is exogenous in the model, so it does not change.
  • Labor demand channel: More vacancies could raise quits, but if the central bank looks through a permanent rise in the price level, aggregate demand and labor demand are unchanged; quits do not change; wages do not change.
  • Therefore, on impact only the real wage adjusts; the cost-of-living shock has no propagation in this model.

Three wage–price spiral stories discussed

  1. Bargaining story: Workers seek compensation for higher living costs from their own employer (Nash bargaining/surplus sharing). The model rules this out by construction.
  2. Outside offers story: Workers search, obtain higher external offers, and return for counteroffers (sequential auction bargaining). Also ruled out by construction.
  3. Preemptive wage rises by employers: Firms raise wages to prevent quits. The paper speaks to this, but it presupposes workers may search for higher wages—an element the discussant suggests is missing.

Job-ladder model and Danish tax reform evidence

  • Ongoing work: A job ladder model with endogenous on-the-job search and sequential auction bargaining.
  • Mechanism: Unemployed accept low initial wages due to absent bargaining power; later, employed workers search, receive outside offers, and may obtain counteroffers from incumbents.
  • Empirical test: Danish tax reform using micro data.
  • 2012 system: People with less than 4 600 euros faced a 42 percent marginal tax rate; above that, 55 percent (13 percentage point increase).
  • 2013 change: The threshold was moved eight percentage points to the right.
  • Implication: At the 2012 threshold, workers experienced a 13 percentage point fall in marginal tax; those far left/right were unaffected for any feasible on-the-job wage gain, yielding an inverse V-shaped differential response across the distribution.
  • Findings:
    • On-the-job search: Inverse V-shaped pattern in both model (red) and data (blue).
    • Wage growth for stayers: Same inverse V-shaped pattern.
    • Leavers: No differential pattern across years, though average wages rise; consistent with the model.

Implications for spiral mechanisms and model design

  • Data reject the Nash bargaining story (would imply a V shape, not inverse V).
  • Data are consistent with the outside offers/counteroffer mechanism.
  • Data reject preemptive wage rises in wage-posting models: a single posted wage for leavers and stayers cannot explain the observed differential behavior.
  • Agreement with Jake’s conclusion: It is unlikely that wage-price spirals are initiated by employers raising wages.
  • Nonetheless, even without unions, workers can exert bargaining power via outside offers and renegotiation.
  • Potential model refinement: Incorporate a wage distribution that makes search meaningful; directed search could give the model a fair chance to test the preemptive mechanism.

Next steps / actions

  • Consider extending the model with directed search and a wage distribution to evaluate preemptive wage-setting under realistic on-the-job search incentives.
  • Open to questions.
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Alfred Anate Bodurin Mayaki

Geopolitical trade fragmentation, inflation, and policy

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Edited by Alfred Anate Bodurin Mayaki, Thursday 2 October 2025 at 01:08

Overview

Presentation by Ludovica Ambrosino, PhD student at LBS and Silvana Tenreyro at the LSE on how geopolitically driven trade fragmentation affects inflation and monetary policy. Context: post-war trade openness has plateaued since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC); a fragmentation index by Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde and his co-authors shows steady increases post-GFC with spikes around the pandemic and the war in Ukraine. Fragmentation implies trade realignment toward “friend-shoring” rather than a fall in openness, raising imported goods prices and lowering real incomes for many countries.

Research questions and preview findings

  • Will fragmentation lead to a high inflation environment? Answer: it depends on the timing and nature of fragmentation and on demand responses. Even with a firm nominal anchor, fragmentation can produce higher inflationary pressures temporarily.
  • Monetary policy response to keep CPI (Consumer Price Index) at target and the behavior of r star (natural rate of interest): it depends on how demand reacts to permanently lower incomes. A sharp demand fall can lower R star.
  • Preview: Front-loaded fragmentation can cause a stagflationary spike (higher CPI inflation with lower output). Gradual, anticipated fragmentation can produce stagnation (lower real incomes, domestic disinflationary forces, and lower natural rates). A tradables TFP (Total Factor Productivity) deterioration generates an initial CPI rise followed by a persistent decline; policy must tighten then loosen.

Model setup (small open New Keynesian economy)

  • Households: two types.
    • Unconstrained: maximize utility over consumption, labor, and assets; trade domestic and foreign riskless bonds subject to a quadratic cost of changing real asset positions; receive labor income and firm profits.
    • Constrained (hand-to-mouth): no financial market access; supply labor and consume all disposable income each period.
  • Firms and sectors:
    • Non-tradables: monopolistic competition and sticky prices; Cobb–Douglas production using domestic labor and imported inputs (e.g., energy); takes input prices as given.
    • Tradables: internationally competitive, prices set internationally; production uses labor.
  • Price aggregation: CPI is a nested composite of tradables and non-tradables; tradables comprise home and foreign goods; non-tradables aggregate differentiated varieties. The foreign tradables price PFT is the import-price shock.
  • Consumption aggregator: CES between tradables and non-tradables; tradables are CES between home and foreign. Home-bias parameter (1 − data) governs openness; a higher foreign share implies greater exposure.
  • Policy: monetary authority targets CPI, responding to deviations from target.
  • Calibration notes: utility deviates from log with unitary elasticity of substitution (extensions consider varying elasticities). The home economy takes rest-of-world dynamics as exogenous.

Bird’s-eye propagation and trade channels

  • Both household types supply labor to domestic production; unconstrained households can borrow domestically and from abroad.
  • Import price shocks affect:
    • Imported inputs in non-tradables production (e.g., energy costs).
    • Foreign tradables in the household consumption basket (alongside home tradables and non-tradables).

Shock scenarios and results (RANK: Representative Agent New Keynesian)

  • Gradual, anticipated rise in foreign prices (PFT):
    • Foreign price level rises gradually and stabilizes higher. Anticipation lowers consumption; labor demand falls; labor supply increases.
    • Natural rate of interest declines with weaker demand.
    • Imported inflation spikes, but the fall in non-tradables inflation dominates; aggregate CPI disinflates over time before recovering. Stagnation: lower activity and lower inflation; policy has room to loosen to bring CPI back to target.
  • Front-loaded, permanent increase in foreign prices:
    • Immediate jump in foreign prices; consumption and real wages fall; natural rate does not change materially.
    • CPI inflation spikes despite falling domestic/non-tradables inflation; the spike is short-lived.
    • Stagflation: higher CPI with lower activity; a sharper policy trade-off emerges.
  • Gradual deterioration in domestic tradables TFP:
    • Consumption falls; natural rate falls.
    • CPI inflation rises initially, then declines persistently.
    • Policy needs to tighten initially and then loosen subsequently.

Introducing hand-to-mouth households (TANK: Two-Agent New Keynesian)

  • Motivation: constrained households cannot smooth against anticipated import price increases, dampening anticipation effects.
  • Demand spillovers: as unconstrained households cut consumption, constrained households’ labor income falls, amplifying their consumption decline.
  • Outcomes: slightly larger consumption fall and stronger reallocation from non-tradables to tradables; inflation and natural rate dynamics are similar to RANK across all scenarios.
    • Gradual import price rise: still stagnation (lower inflation, activity, and natural rate).
    • Front-loaded import price jump: still stagflation (higher CPI with lower activity).
    • Tradables TFP shock: similar qualitative results to RANK.

Role of trade openness

  • Greater openness raises exposure to foreign price shocks, leading to larger declines in consumption and real wages, and stronger reallocation toward home tradables.
  • Gradual import price rise: more open economies experience larger falls in domestic inflation components and in the natural rate; deeper stagnation.
  • Front-loaded import price jump: the policy trade-off is more difficult in more open economies (higher CPI inflation despite weaker demand).
  • Domestic tradables TFP shock: openness matters less for the shock’s origin, but being open helps diversify away from the affected home tradables sector, making output effects less adverse. Consumption in more open economies can fall more due to the distribution of profits (unconstrained households take a bigger hit).

Monetary policy implications

  • With a credible nominal anchor, fragmentation need not cause persistently higher inflation, though it can raise inflationary pressures temporarily.
  • The natural rate (R star) declines when fragmentation or TFP shocks depress demand and real incomes.
  • Policy stance by scenario: ease under gradual, anticipated fragmentation; tighten under front-loaded import price jumps; tighten-then-loosen under domestic tradables TFP deterioration.
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