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Notes on Butler (The Self as Primitive Concept)

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Edited by Terry O'Sullivan, Thursday 20 October 2011 at 14:08

Butler responded to Locke on identity in an essay Of Personal Identity published 1736.

 

-- our future existence a really important question - but [Locke's] overcomplicated issue of personal identity

-- it's obvious: '..by reflection upon that which is my self now, and that which was my self twenty years ago, I discern tht they are not two, but one and the same self' (Butler, 2008 [1736], p. 281)

-- consciousness of past makes us aware of our identity, but it does not constitute our identity -- 'any more than knowledge, in any other case, can constitute truth, which it presupposes' (ibid)

-- present consciousness of our past actions is not necessary to make us the same persons who committed them -- we just are, whether we remember them or not!

-- 'same' is a tricky concept. E.g. the same tree standing there for 50 years is actually a different tree but we know what we mean when we say it. But philosophically speaking the tree now is not the same as it was. Substance and therefore properties are different. [not sure about this following bit though] -- when we say sameness in a plant means the same life going on in the same organisation through potentially variable particles of , the word 'same' does not mean 'same' when applied to matter [my problem here is that plants are made of matter are they not?] So loosely we are OK to say the plant is the same (life and organisation continue) 'But in a strict and philosophical manner of speech, no man, no being, no mode of being, no anything, can be the same with that with which it has indeed nothing the same' Argues therefore that personal identity cannot remain the same through changed substance.

-- but, B argues, Locke [in spite of his care to separate substance from person!] implies that person is the same substance, person= 'a thinking intelligent being', and personal identity = 'the sameness of a rational being' quoted from L apparently.  Being and Substance are the same thing in this context according to B. We can have different, successive, consciousnesses of our own existence -- but it remains the same existence. 'they are consciousnesses of one and the same thing or object, of the same person, self, or living agent' (ibid, 282).

-- says that L's observations are admittedly hasty, but have been developed by others to the idea that personality is ever changing. 'no one can any more remain one and the same person two moments together than two successive moments can be one and the same moment' (ibid, 283) [although he tries to let Locke off the hook, his phrase 'it is not substance but consciousness alone which constitutes personality' sounds rather like Locke! This view doesn't make sense as it absolves us from responsibility and suggests we should not be concerned with our future [sounds like Parfit?]

1 not consistent with our experience and conduct re self concern.

2 only beings are capable of life and action -- they are the same living beings [subjects] throughout their live, nobody else. Plus you can only be conscious of something that has already happened, which vouches for the existence of the self prior to its consciousness of itself. Plus we are limited in our perceptions so no wonder there are gaps in consciousness!

3 if a person is a substance, then being conscious of personal identity is the same as being conscious of substantial identity [not sure if I get this either! sounds a bit circular] -- similiar argument for if a person is a quality of a substance.

-- finally, casts scorn on doubting continuity of personal identity as it 'it is a question concerning the truth of perception by memory' -- you could doubt perception by other things such as reasoning or deduction. 'For it is ridiculous to attempt to prove th truth of those preceptions whose trught we can no othewise prove than by other perceptions of exactly the same kind with them' (ibid, 284)

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More on Hume

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Edited by Terry O'Sullivan, Monday 10 October 2011 at 10:55

Notes on Ch3.3 -- I found re-reading the Hume extract in slow mo with commentary useful.

clearer what he is targeting with this argument (both in particular, i.e. Butler whom I must get round to reading!, and in general, i.e. his doctrine about impressions leading to ideas, and the relation between them)

Re impressions and ideas, by the way, I don't understand what he means by 'outward or inward' impressions. I also doubt that 'ideas, especially abstract ones, are naturally faint and obscure' (Hume, 2008 [1748], p. 15, cited p. 69 Book 1). What about ideas like politics, religion, ideological commitments, loyalty (if that's an idea?) which all seem potentially very strong to me. Perhaps there's a confusion in my understanding of internal impression and idea in this sense.

clearer how para 2 is an example of 'Hume's fork' (i.e. if a statement doesn't contain abstract quantitative reasoning or evidence it needs burning). I like the idea of Hume as an advocate of book burning -- the illiberal infidel at work. (Hume, 2008 [1748], p. 120, cited p. 70 Book 1)

surprised by the sense I now get of para 3 as advocating an impersonal bubble of experience being a 'person' -- or a non-person? Seems 2me to strike a parallel with the postmodern sense in which we are positioned as 'subjects' within discourse rather than establishing ourselves as individuals. Though this doesn't quite jump with what I take to be Hume';s positivism. E.g. 'when we have often employed any term, though without a distinct meaning, we are apt to imagine it has a determinate idea annexed to it' (Hume, 2008 [1748], p. 15, cited p. 69 Book 1)-- underestimates the constitutive effect of language.

also had not understood properly how para 3 follows on from the other two, it's function in setting out the argument that it's only perceptions that keep you in play as a 'person' (for want of a better word).

Paras 5 & 6

Still having some trouble with these. Why should the difference between real and perceived identity (say of a tree which changes imperceptibly over time and thsu only appears to have stable identity with itself) be relevant to perceptions of the self when, according to Hume, the self is not to be perceived anyway? I thought, when I read this the first time, that he was making a point about perception in general rather than something about the self -- and I haven't got beyond this understanding.

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