Notes on Ch3.3 -- I found re-reading the Hume extract in slow mo with commentary useful.
clearer what he is targeting with this argument (both in particular, i.e. Butler whom I must get round to reading!, and in general, i.e. his doctrine about impressions leading to ideas, and the relation between them)
Re impressions and ideas, by the way, I don't understand what he means by 'outward or inward' impressions. I also doubt that 'ideas, especially abstract ones, are naturally faint and obscure' (Hume, 2008 [1748], p. 15, cited p. 69 Book 1). What about ideas like politics, religion, ideological commitments, loyalty (if that's an idea?) which all seem potentially very strong to me. Perhaps there's a confusion in my understanding of internal impression and idea in this sense.
clearer how para 2 is an example of 'Hume's fork' (i.e. if a statement doesn't contain abstract quantitative reasoning or evidence it needs burning). I like the idea of Hume as an advocate of book burning -- the illiberal infidel at work. (Hume, 2008 [1748], p. 120, cited p. 70 Book 1)
surprised by the sense I now get of para 3 as advocating an impersonal bubble of experience being a 'person' -- or a non-person? Seems 2me to strike a parallel with the postmodern sense in which we are positioned as 'subjects' within discourse rather than establishing ourselves as individuals. Though this doesn't quite jump with what I take to be Hume';s positivism. E.g. 'when we have often employed any term, though without a distinct meaning, we are apt to imagine it has a determinate idea annexed to it' (Hume, 2008 [1748], p. 15, cited p. 69 Book 1)-- underestimates the constitutive effect of language.
also had not understood properly how para 3 follows on from the other two, it's function in setting out the argument that it's only perceptions that keep you in play as a 'person' (for want of a better word).
Paras 5 & 6
Still having some trouble with these. Why should the difference between real and perceived identity (say of a tree which changes imperceptibly over time and thsu only appears to have stable identity with itself) be relevant to perceptions of the self when, according to Hume, the self is not to be perceived anyway? I thought, when I read this the first time, that he was making a point about perception in general rather than something about the self -- and I haven't got beyond this understanding.