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Uploaded my great thoughts on Locke et al yesterday. Have rejigged it a bit in the light of the forum discussions (which I have had difficulty following I must admit). I find myself being very studenty -- taking note of what the tutor said (e.g. have managed to squeeze Hume and Parfit in somehow, although not managed to develop a critique of Locke from their point of view really). Tried to explain a couple of things that made me feel uncomfortable about them all -- will see what comes back.

Now on to philosophy of religion. The pictures look good.

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TMA1 thoughts

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I have, I think, completed a draft of TMA1 but I have to say it's been hard work shy Not unenjoyable, I'm pleased to say, but a real brain-knotter. Not sure if it is any good, actually, but at least it's done. Will put it away now and have another look in a week or two.

Tricky to try to critique Locke given (a) difficulty of getting into the language to his meaning, or as near as I can, and (b) difficulty of getting my head around his 'puzzle cases' in Mackie's admirable phrase, and (c) difficulty of  having to deal with the ideas as they are there, rather than what I'm bringing to it in terms of preconceptions and prejudices (or commitments, depending on how you see things?)

There seems so much one could write about and in so many directions. I kept starting an idea and then disagreeing with it as I tried to develop it. Is that what philosophers do? God knows how they finish anything in that case, or perhaps it's meant to be an ongoing situation...

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Notes on Butler (The Self as Primitive Concept)

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Edited by Terry O'Sullivan, Thursday 20 October 2011 at 14:08

Butler responded to Locke on identity in an essay Of Personal Identity published 1736.

 

-- our future existence a really important question - but [Locke's] overcomplicated issue of personal identity

-- it's obvious: '..by reflection upon that which is my self now, and that which was my self twenty years ago, I discern tht they are not two, but one and the same self' (Butler, 2008 [1736], p. 281)

-- consciousness of past makes us aware of our identity, but it does not constitute our identity -- 'any more than knowledge, in any other case, can constitute truth, which it presupposes' (ibid)

-- present consciousness of our past actions is not necessary to make us the same persons who committed them -- we just are, whether we remember them or not!

-- 'same' is a tricky concept. E.g. the same tree standing there for 50 years is actually a different tree but we know what we mean when we say it. But philosophically speaking the tree now is not the same as it was. Substance and therefore properties are different. [not sure about this following bit though] -- when we say sameness in a plant means the same life going on in the same organisation through potentially variable particles of , the word 'same' does not mean 'same' when applied to matter [my problem here is that plants are made of matter are they not?] So loosely we are OK to say the plant is the same (life and organisation continue) 'But in a strict and philosophical manner of speech, no man, no being, no mode of being, no anything, can be the same with that with which it has indeed nothing the same' Argues therefore that personal identity cannot remain the same through changed substance.

-- but, B argues, Locke [in spite of his care to separate substance from person!] implies that person is the same substance, person= 'a thinking intelligent being', and personal identity = 'the sameness of a rational being' quoted from L apparently.  Being and Substance are the same thing in this context according to B. We can have different, successive, consciousnesses of our own existence -- but it remains the same existence. 'they are consciousnesses of one and the same thing or object, of the same person, self, or living agent' (ibid, 282).

-- says that L's observations are admittedly hasty, but have been developed by others to the idea that personality is ever changing. 'no one can any more remain one and the same person two moments together than two successive moments can be one and the same moment' (ibid, 283) [although he tries to let Locke off the hook, his phrase 'it is not substance but consciousness alone which constitutes personality' sounds rather like Locke! This view doesn't make sense as it absolves us from responsibility and suggests we should not be concerned with our future [sounds like Parfit?]

1 not consistent with our experience and conduct re self concern.

2 only beings are capable of life and action -- they are the same living beings [subjects] throughout their live, nobody else. Plus you can only be conscious of something that has already happened, which vouches for the existence of the self prior to its consciousness of itself. Plus we are limited in our perceptions so no wonder there are gaps in consciousness!

3 if a person is a substance, then being conscious of personal identity is the same as being conscious of substantial identity [not sure if I get this either! sounds a bit circular] -- similiar argument for if a person is a quality of a substance.

-- finally, casts scorn on doubting continuity of personal identity as it 'it is a question concerning the truth of perception by memory' -- you could doubt perception by other things such as reasoning or deduction. 'For it is ridiculous to attempt to prove th truth of those preceptions whose trught we can no othewise prove than by other perceptions of exactly the same kind with them' (ibid, 284)

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Do I ever have a direct experience of myself?

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Edited by Terry O'Sullivan, Monday 10 October 2011 at 10:54

I've been thinking about this since coming across Locke and Hume in A222 Book 1.

I'm pretty sure I am me, and that the persons to whom I relate in life are themselves as well. While Locke emphasises the forensic in personal identity, I'd see it as more positive -- if I'm not me how can I learn or grow or develop (I suppose I do entertain a dynamic view of self, I optimistically believe in personal change and change in general) as well as be responsible or deserving. But I'm trying to bracket these self-interested (!) views while answering this question (Activity on p. 73 of Book 1).

I experience myself in trivial but surprising ways -- e.g. habits of interrupting others, finding myself driving in a particular direction out of habit when I should be going somewhere else, losing things and knowing that usually I have put them somewhere high up rather than low down in a room, liking certain types of music but not others (though my tastes are pretty catholic, I have never really 'got' jazz I regret to say), prejudices (more difficult to spot, acknowledge and change than opinions) and so on. All of these things are like a rather shadowy presence which manifests itself now and then, often a bit uncomfortably, but alows me to discover something about 'myself' which I can then be conscious of (at least for a bit) and try to do something about.

I like Kant's idea of the self as a kind of structuring mechanism (Simon Blackburn in the 'Hume on the self' audio) -- I'm sure that I filter my experiences through the person I am already, which is a bit sad as it means I'm condemned to remain the same unless I watch myself carefully. And of course, watching myself means there must be something to watch. Doesn't it?

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Locke stocke and barrele

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Edited by Terry O'Sullivan, Friday 7 October 2011 at 10:35

Had brain trouble trying to get to grips with the Locke reading. I think the reason is that I'm coming to it with my own convictions about the nature of the self (i.e. indivisible from what I believe is the soul, responsible, continuous from conception to death, learning, future-oriented, etc.) so have to get round them to give him room for his. Is this bracketing of my own convictions part of what philosophers call charity?

I also find myself uncomfortable with the term 'thought experiment' which seems an important one in the apparatus of philosophy. Why not call them 'scenarios' or 'hypothetical situations' instead? The term 'experiment' just seems misleading to me, for the reasons mentioned in the course materials (ie. associated with a process of isolating a variable and studying its behaviour in relation to one or more other variables in a controlled situation). The term just sounds fatuous and nerdy to me. I wonder why I feel so strongly about this?

With Locke I just feel like shaking the bloke and saying -- but you can't have two minds in one body!, Socrates' soul has not transferred to the Mayor of whereever it is (whoever he was!), what is all that about a little finger for god's sake, and the prince and cobbler proves nothing because it's just a daft storyangry. I can only imagine I have misunderstood all this stuff and after I have lain down in a darkened room for a bit, all will become clear.

The final bit about the law justly punishing drunks and sleepwalkers because they can't prove they can't remember their amnesia also seems daft. You can't prove you've forgotten something in any case, so why does Locke excuse amnesiacs from responsibility earlier in the extract (as I understand it at the moment anyway)? God setting all things right at the day of judgement sounds like a nice back stop, but we should not have to wait that long to be just (I'm sure God agrees) and if you follow that argument (i.e. it will all come out in the divine wash) to its ultimate conclusion you might end up abandoning the project of human justice altogether.

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