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Uploaded my great thoughts on Locke et al yesterday. Have rejigged it a bit in the light of the forum discussions (which I have had difficulty following I must admit). I find myself being very studenty -- taking note of what the tutor said (e.g. have managed to squeeze Hume and Parfit in somehow, although not managed to develop a critique of Locke from their point of view really). Tried to explain a couple of things that made me feel uncomfortable about them all -- will see what comes back.

Now on to philosophy of religion. The pictures look good.

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Liberation from the self

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Just read the Parfit extract in the reader and thought I'd post a few thoughts.

  • It was a lot easier to understand than I had been led to believe (if I have, of course, understood it smile) but this might be because of having listened to the audio stuff a couple of times already and, of course, having had the benefit of the course texts as well. But certainly more straightforward than Locke or Hume by a long way.
  • At the same time I find his language odd -- would 'quaint' be the word? Determined to use what sound like everyday, conversational words. e.g. 'Can this matter much?'.  Or 'my death seems to me less bad'. Some times some very precise, but weird, periphrasis is necessary for him to point the distinction between what we tend to believe and what is 'true'. Plus the emphasis on things being 'hard to believe'.
  • This contributes to the impression I got reading him of a very original mind -- certainly seeing and expressing things in a way which defamiliarises them for me.
  • I was also struck by the emotional content -- the sense of genuine relief he conveys when talking about how his 'belief' changed; of being able to get out of the 'glass tunnel' and feel more connected to others. Very striking reference to Hume's 'darkness and utter loneliness' as well -- must look that up (Treatise Book 1, part iv, section 7, para 8 according to Cottingham's footnote).

I feel different about Parfit now -- a bit more receptive perhaps? Certainly I will never watch Star Trek the same way again...

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Do I ever have a direct experience of myself?

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Edited by Terry O'Sullivan, Monday 10 October 2011 at 10:54

I've been thinking about this since coming across Locke and Hume in A222 Book 1.

I'm pretty sure I am me, and that the persons to whom I relate in life are themselves as well. While Locke emphasises the forensic in personal identity, I'd see it as more positive -- if I'm not me how can I learn or grow or develop (I suppose I do entertain a dynamic view of self, I optimistically believe in personal change and change in general) as well as be responsible or deserving. But I'm trying to bracket these self-interested (!) views while answering this question (Activity on p. 73 of Book 1).

I experience myself in trivial but surprising ways -- e.g. habits of interrupting others, finding myself driving in a particular direction out of habit when I should be going somewhere else, losing things and knowing that usually I have put them somewhere high up rather than low down in a room, liking certain types of music but not others (though my tastes are pretty catholic, I have never really 'got' jazz I regret to say), prejudices (more difficult to spot, acknowledge and change than opinions) and so on. All of these things are like a rather shadowy presence which manifests itself now and then, often a bit uncomfortably, but alows me to discover something about 'myself' which I can then be conscious of (at least for a bit) and try to do something about.

I like Kant's idea of the self as a kind of structuring mechanism (Simon Blackburn in the 'Hume on the self' audio) -- I'm sure that I filter my experiences through the person I am already, which is a bit sad as it means I'm condemned to remain the same unless I watch myself carefully. And of course, watching myself means there must be something to watch. Doesn't it?

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More on Hume

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Edited by Terry O'Sullivan, Monday 10 October 2011 at 10:55

Notes on Ch3.3 -- I found re-reading the Hume extract in slow mo with commentary useful.

clearer what he is targeting with this argument (both in particular, i.e. Butler whom I must get round to reading!, and in general, i.e. his doctrine about impressions leading to ideas, and the relation between them)

Re impressions and ideas, by the way, I don't understand what he means by 'outward or inward' impressions. I also doubt that 'ideas, especially abstract ones, are naturally faint and obscure' (Hume, 2008 [1748], p. 15, cited p. 69 Book 1). What about ideas like politics, religion, ideological commitments, loyalty (if that's an idea?) which all seem potentially very strong to me. Perhaps there's a confusion in my understanding of internal impression and idea in this sense.

clearer how para 2 is an example of 'Hume's fork' (i.e. if a statement doesn't contain abstract quantitative reasoning or evidence it needs burning). I like the idea of Hume as an advocate of book burning -- the illiberal infidel at work. (Hume, 2008 [1748], p. 120, cited p. 70 Book 1)

surprised by the sense I now get of para 3 as advocating an impersonal bubble of experience being a 'person' -- or a non-person? Seems 2me to strike a parallel with the postmodern sense in which we are positioned as 'subjects' within discourse rather than establishing ourselves as individuals. Though this doesn't quite jump with what I take to be Hume';s positivism. E.g. 'when we have often employed any term, though without a distinct meaning, we are apt to imagine it has a determinate idea annexed to it' (Hume, 2008 [1748], p. 15, cited p. 69 Book 1)-- underestimates the constitutive effect of language.

also had not understood properly how para 3 follows on from the other two, it's function in setting out the argument that it's only perceptions that keep you in play as a 'person' (for want of a better word).

Paras 5 & 6

Still having some trouble with these. Why should the difference between real and perceived identity (say of a tree which changes imperceptibly over time and thsu only appears to have stable identity with itself) be relevant to perceptions of the self when, according to Hume, the self is not to be perceived anyway? I thought, when I read this the first time, that he was making a point about perception in general rather than something about the self -- and I haven't got beyond this understanding.

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Book 1, p. 63, 2nd Actvity

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Edited by Terry O'Sullivan, Saturday 8 October 2011 at 15:53

Here's a paraphrase of the first four paragraphs as I currently understand them:

 

1. Some philosophers [apparently Hume had Butler in mind] take consciousness of the self for granted. Intense experiences, they claim, don't distract us from this consciousness but amplify it. [not sure I have got this bit or the following right!] Trying to prove this would be counter-productive; and if we doubt our consciousness of ourselves we can't be sure of anything.

2.This does not wash, unfortunately. These assertions of consciousness of self are not supported by experience, and we don't have an idea of self. How on earth would we experience the self? This question leads us into absurdities, but we must try to answer it if we want to claim that the concept of the self has any meaning. Our ideas come from experience. So our idea of the self should come from experience. If our 'self' is the same thing the whole time, then the experience should be equally constant. But experience is ever-changing, so that can't be how the self manifests itself to us.

3. But if we accept that experience is ever-changing [if that's what he means by 'this hypothesis' -- might have got that wrong] how do we deal with the way we perceive things? Our perceptions are all separate and independent of each other, or anything else. So what relationship do they have with the 'self'? Whenever I try to perceive my 'self' I end up perceiving sensations or emotions, not 'self'. When I'm asleep and stop perceiving anything, I have no sense of myself and so stop existing. Death will put an end to any perceptions and thus to my self as well. I can't think of anything other than death that will annihilate me. [not sure where this is going] I am so convinced about this that I don't think I'd be able to argue sensibly with anyone who disagreed -- although I acknowledge we may be coming from different places on this.

4. But for those who share my paradigm, I see us all as an ongoing bundle of experiences, ever-changing through time. Sight, thought, talents, are all shifting and dynamic. Our minds are like stages on which perceptions act for a bit and then exit, to be followed by others. There's nothing simple about it if we took a cross section, and there's nothing that remains the same across time about it either (in spite of the fact we fool ourselves into believing there might be). Our minds are ongoing situations, and we don't have a clue about what they are like really.

 

I found that exercise quite hard work, but am glad I did it as I can come back to these notes and hone my understanding (or perhaps develop my interpretation, in time) of what Hume is on about!

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